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Abstract
Title: Unmanned Aerial System Integration into the National Airspace System
and Airports: Risk Mitigation Using Content Analysis Methodology
Author: Bhoomin Bhupendrabhai Chauhan
Major Advisor: Dr. Deborah Carstens
Over the last few years, the use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has
significantly increased. With an increase in the use of UASs, the number of
UAS sightings near manned aircraft and airports have also increased, as shown
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)(FAA, 2019a). Although not
every near sighting had a severe consequence associated with it, the risks were
still present. As UASs are becoming more readily available to the general
public, the risks present due to UASs flying in the National Airspace System
(NAS) and near airports is also increasing. For the study, incident and accident
reports were obtained from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
and the Aviation Safety Report System (ASRS) databases. After the reports
were downloaded, reports that did not have information regarding UASs were
discarded. Two instrument forms were developed, one for NTSB reports and
one for ASRS reports. Next, qualitative content analysis was used to identify
the most frequently occurring Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS) of the contributing factors and probable cause(s) of the
reported incident or accident. After the HFACS categories were identified for
the NTSB and ASRS reports, all the incidents that had a similar chain of events
were grouped for representation in the Bow-tieXP software. After the analysis,
i

a total of seven bow-tie diagrams were created with each representing the
identified event identified from the content analysis. The bow-tie diagrams
helped identify the threats that could lead to the occurrence of the top event. If
the top event occurred, the consequences arising from them were documented.
The bow-tie diagram also helped identify barriers that could be used so that the
risks associated with each threat and consequence were mitigated. After the
bow-tie diagrams were completed, recommendations were made for safe
operations of UASs in the NAS and airports.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Problem Statement
The purpose of this study is to determine the risks associated with
integrating UAS in the NAS and airports. The current study examines incident
and accident reports through content analysis. The goal of the study was to
identify safety recommendations for UAS operators in the NAS or near airports
to mitigate or minimize risks.
Operational Definitions
The operational definitions have been established for the study and are
discussed in this section. UAS is commonly also referred to as an unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) or a drone. It is an aircraft model which can operate
without a pilot onboard. It can operate with the help of a communication link
that is established between the pilot and the UAS.
NTSB reports, in the context of the current study, are defined as UAS
incident and accident reports obtained from the NTSB Aviation Accident &
Synopses database. The date range of the reports used in the study is January
2008 through January 2018. Reports were identified through searching on
keyword strings consisting of UAV, UAS, drone for specific aircraft make and
model.
ASRS reports, in the context of the current study, are defined as UAS
incident and accident reports obtained from the ASRS website. The date range
of the reports used in the study is January 2008 through January 2018. The
1

reports were identified through entering the term UAV as the aircraft make and
model.
The NAS, in general terms, is defined as different classes or layers of
separation for the aircraft to fly. These classes are determined by the volume of
traffic that passes through them. The different classes come with their own set
of regulations and operational limitations for the aircraft (including the UAS)
flying through them.
Airports are defined as a facility, area of land, or area of water, which
has been designated for use for landing, or take-off of aircraft (FAA, 2016b).
This also includes the area that is used for airport facilities, operations, and
buildings.
Contributing factor, in the context of the current study, is defined as one
of the primary causes or factors that lead to UAS incidents or accidents.
Bow-tie diagram, in the context of the current study, is defined as a
visual tool that provides an overview of multiple, plausible scenarios and
displays the type of barriers that can be placed to control the threats that may
arise for a given scenario (CGE Risk Management Solutions, n.d.).
Barriers, for the current study, are defined using two terms: control
barrier and recovery barrier (CGE Academy, n.d.). Control barriers are defined
as a barrier that will prevent a threat from occurring, but if the threat still
presents itself, it will reduce the impact so that the top event does not occur.
Recovery barrier is defined as a barrier that is placed to make sure that if the top
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event is reached, the scenario does not escalate into a severe consequence. The
recovery barrier can also act as a way to mitigate the risk.
UAS incidents are defined as an event that occurs when an operating
UAS suffers from a sudden malfunction. This includes but is not limited to
mechanical failure, resulting in the loss of control of the UAS. It also includes
the remotely located pilot losing situational awareness of the UAS that he or she
is operating resulting in either a loss of communication link or near collision
with an object, or terrain in the path of the UAS.
UAS accidents are defined as a UAS involved in a severe crash that may
or may not be dangerous depending upon the consequence of the crash.
Risk, in the context of the current study, is defined as the chance or the
probability that a person on the ground or passengers in manned aircraft will be
affected or harmed because of the hazard of operating a UAS. These losses are
not limited to humans because risks can also apply to the loss or damage of an
aircraft component, damage to property, failure of equipment, and adverse
effect on the surrounding environment.
Background
Recently, UAS popularity has increased. It is no longer limited to
military use as the popularity of UAS use is also increasing among civilian or
recreational use such as for film making, merchandise delivery, aerial
photography, etc. (Cho, Cho, & Jeon, 2016). UAS accidents are increasingly
causing damage to humans and property. The rise in the number of accidents
has brought to light the concern for safety and security of operating a UAS. Cho
3

et al. states that ―Over the same number of flight hours, accidents caused by
drones amount to 50 times the number of general flight accidents, and accidents
caused by users‘ mistakes while controlling the drone make up 32% of all
relevant accidents‖ (p. 345).
With advancements in technology and the increased use of UAS for
military operations, the operational capabilities have been proven for potential
civil and commercial UAS use (Weibel, 2005). With the potential of UAS for
civil and commercial use, there is a demand for more federal regulations to help
guide safe operations for UAS. The lack of adequate federal regulations has
proven to be an obstacle for safe UAS operations.
With the fast development of miniaturization and low-cost
manufacturing of simple consumer electronics, UASs or drones are readily
available to the general population through online vendors and electronics
supermarkets (La Cour-Harbo, 2017). With easy availability, there is an
increase in civil UAS use. When a UAS is operated in the NAS or near airports,
it can pose an imminent threat to aircraft that are flying in the NAS, and to
equipment or ground personnel at the airport. Military or government UAS use
does not pose a significant threat when compared to civilian use as the majority
of the UAS used for military missions are flown under strict regulations, but
that does not mean that military operated UAS are entirely safe. Equipment
failure, loss of communication link, or loss of situational awareness pose a
threat. The pilots may not be aware of the airspace or regulatory limitations of
operating a UAS in that particular area. During such use, if the UAS is operated
4

near an airport, it may come in the approach path of an arriving aircraft posing a
severe threat of mid-air collision. Similarly, if the UAS is operated above the
designated altitude, it may result in a similar severe consequence.
Over the last few years, as displayed in Figure 1, the number of reported
UAS sightings has steadily increased, and there have been instances where the
presence of UASs near an aircraft or a helicopter has encountered a poor
outcome. For example, on September 21, 2017, a United States (U.S.) Black
Hawk helicopter was involved in a collision with an unmanned aircraft while it
was performing a routine low-altitude flight in Staten Island, New York
(Wallace, Haritos, & Robbins, 2018). Even though the helicopter made it back
safely, due to the collision, the rotor blades of the helicopter were severely
damaged.
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Figure 1: Increase in UAS Sightings (FAA, 2019a)
Similarly, in 2014, The New York City Police Department alleged that
one of their helicopters was struck twice by a UAS at 2,000 feet. Even in this
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case, the helicopter made it back safely (Wallace et al., 2018). Such incidents
were not limited to the U.S. in 2017; a Canadian SkyJet King Air-100
Turboprop was also struck by a UAS while on approach to its destination.
With a projected increase in the number of UAS use, the number of
sightings will also be on the rise. Depending upon the nature of the violation of
these sightings, the number of incidents and accidents may also increase. It is
essential that necessary steps are taken to ensure that any risk that is associated
with the operation of UAS is mitigated and brought to an acceptable level.
Research Questions
The research questions answered through conducting this study are
listed below:
RQ1: What are the risks associated with integrating UAS into the NAS
and airports?
RQ2: What are recommendations to mitigate or reduce the risks of UAS
operation into the NAS and airports?
Significance of Study
As previously stated, there is an increase in the use of UAS and related
incidents and accidents. UAS use is projected to continue to increase. It is
crucial for UAS operators to understand the associated risks when flying UASs
into the NAS and near airports. While military use is carried out under strict
regulation and supervision, an anomaly can happen and result in serious
consequences. Civilian use may be carried out with or without concern for rules
that regulate its use, and for a myriad of reasons that can result in a UAS
6

incident and accident. This study, as discussed in the methodology chapter, will
develop themes from the reports identified through content analysis. Content
analysis, as a methodology, can be used to analyze documents as it allows the
researcher to understand the collected data and develop a systematic description
of a phenomenon (Elo & Kyngäsh, 2008). Content analysis will point out the
most frequently occurring contributing factors and probable cause(s) that have
led to UAS incidents and accidents. The contributing factors and probable
cause(s) will then be visually represented in a bow-tie diagram to identify the
risks associated with each contributing factor. Also, the bow-tie diagram will
assist through displaying the barriers that can be implemented resulting in
mitigated or reduced risks. The bow-tie diagram in acting as a visual
representation will display what needs to be done regarding which barriers need
to be implemented so that the risk level is brought to an acceptable level.
The process of integrating threats arising from the contributing factors
and probable cause(s) identified through the content analysis and displayed
through a bow-tie diagram will provide a UAS risk assessment. This will then
result in recommendations to mitigate or reduce risks by recommending
barriers.
Generalizability
Generalizability of a study indicates the extent to which the study can be
generalized over a population. The results of this study will focus on the reports
that were used as part of the data collection procedure. This study will account
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for both military and civilian use in terms of integrating UASs into the NAS and
near airports.
The methodology chapter will discuss the data analysis for each NTSB
and ASRS report to identify contributing factors and probable cause(s). After
thoroughly analyzing the reports, the most frequently occurring contributing
factors and probable cause(s) will be noted. The reports obtained have
information regarding UAS incidents and accidents for both military and
civilian use. Therefore, the barriers identified for each risk associated with the
most frequently occurring contributing factor can be generalizable for different
types of UAS use. This is due to the contributing factors and probable cause(s)
identified as the most common causes of UAS incidents and accidents.
Therefore, the identified barriers can act as recommendations on what needs to
be implemented to provide adequate measures and to ensure safe integration all
type of UAS.
Limitations
Limitations of this study can be listed as factors that limit the scope and
reach of the study.
The first limitation of the study is that the reports that were analyzed
have been collected from the ASRS website and the NTSB website. However,
the reports that are submitted to the ASRS database are generally submitted
voluntarily making it difficult to predict the accuracy of the data available.
A second limitation is that it also needs to be noted that not all UAS
sightings or incidents and accidents are reported on the ASRS database, which
8

will ultimately result in not all contributing factors and probable cause(s) being
identified.
A third and similar limitation will also arise when using the NTSB
accident database. UAS accident reports generated from the NTSB database is
comprised of Part 121 and Part 135 reports. The FAA authorizes air carriers to
operate scheduled air service under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121
certificate (FAA, 2018c). Air carriers that are generally allowed to operate
under Part 121 include U.S. based large airlines, regional airlines, and all-cargo
airlines. Air carriers that are authorized to operate under Part 135 vary from
small single-engine aircraft operators to large operators that often provide a
network to move passengers and cargo for Part 121 carriers (FAA, 2018d). The
reports will need to be carefully analyzed to make sure that Part 121 and Part
135 reports are not included with UAS incidents and accident reports.
A fourth limitation of the study is that the data available for use
constitute a small number of the actual UAS incidents and accidents. This does
not include UAS sightings such as a UAS sighted above designated operational
altitude or observed UASs operating near an active runway or an airport. UAS
sighting, if not dangerous at this point, can prove to be fatal if corrective
measures are not taken. Because there is no way of knowing the actual number
of UAS incidents and accidents, there is a lack of available data for a
comprehensive risk assessment of UAS integration into the NAS and airports.

9

Delimitations
Delimitations for a study are the methods used to ensure study
boundaries are maintained for the scope of the study.
The first delimitation employed is that the reports downloaded from the
NTSB website were thoroughly studied to ensure that reports without
information regarding UAS incidents were discarded. Therefore, adequate
consistency was maintained in terms of information available from each ASRS
and NTSB report.
The second delimitation employed was the development of themes for
contributing factors and probable cause(s) that were extracted from the reports.
These themes acted as a summary of the contributing factors and probable
cause(s) found in the reports. Using a different bow-tie diagram for each
contributing factor and probable cause would result in repetition of the barriers
resulting in the same contributing factors and probable cause(s) being displayed
in multiple bow-tie diagrams and would increase the complexity of interpreting
the task of risk assessment for each contributing factor and probable cause. To
ensure that this does not happen from among themes identified in the content
analysis, recurring contributing factors and probable cause(s) were sorted and
incorporated into bow-tie diagrams. This made it easier to identify
recommendations that should be implemented from the identified barriers
affiliated from the contributing factor and probable cause.

10

Chapter 2
Literature Review
National Airspace System
The NAS, in general, can be defined as different categories or
demarcation for all aircraft to fly over the U.S. airspace (U.S. Department of
Transportation, 2017). The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 established the FAA,
which is responsible for the control of the navigational airspace over the U.S.
After its creation, the FAA created the NAS to establish a safe and efficient
airspace environment for civil, commercial, and military aviation operations.
The NAS has two categories of airspace/airspace areas, namely Regulatory
Airspace and Non-regulatory Airspace.
The regulatory airspace consists of category A, B, C, D, and E airspace
areas, restricted and prohibited area while non-regulatory airspace consists of
military operation areas, warning areas, alert areas, and controlled firing areas
(U.S. Department of Transportation, 2017). In these two categories, the airspace
is further categorized, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation,
―these two categories are divided into four types. These types are Controlled,
Uncontrolled, Special use, and Other Airspace‖ (p. 3-1-1).
These different categories of airspace, as shown in Figure 2, are devised
depending upon the complexity or density of aircraft movements, the nature of
operations conducted with the airspace, the level of safety required, and national
and public interests (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2017).
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Controlled airspace is more of a generic term used to identify the
different classes of airspace, mainly Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and
Class E airspace. Controlled airspace is the defined dimensions within which air
traffic controller (ATC) service is provided to the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
flights, and Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flights according to the airspace
classification.

Figure 2: Different Airspace Classes With Their Respective Upper Limits (U.S.
Department of Transportation, 2017, p. 3-2-1)
Class A Airspace. ―Class A airspace is generally that airspace that is
from 18,000 mean sea level (MSL) up to and including flight level (FL) 600.
Class A airspace also includes the airspace overlying the waters within 12
nautical miles (NM) off the coast of 48 contiguous states and Alaska‖ (U.S.
Department of Transportation, 2017, p. 3-2-2). Class A also includes any
designated international airspace that is beyond 12 NM off the coast of 48
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contiguous states and Alaska and is within areas of domestic radio navigational
signal or is within ATC radar coverage.
Class B Airspace.―Class B airspace is generally that airspace from the
surface to 10,000 MSL surrounding the nation‘s busiest airport in terms of IFR
operations or passenger enplanements‖ (U.S. Department of Transportation,
2017, p. 3-2-2). The configuration of each Class B airspace area is individually
customized and consists of a surface area and more than two layers that are
designed to contain all the published instrument procedures once an aircraft
enters the designated airspace. An ATC clearance is mandatory for all aircraft to
operate in an area and the cleared aircraft receive separation services within the
airspace.
Class C Airspace. "Class C airspace starts from the surface to 4,000
MSL surrounding those airports that have an operational control tower, have
radar approach control as well as have a certain number of IFR operations and
passenger enplanements" (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2017. p. 3-2-4).
Class C airspace is also customized for each airport. The airspace usually
consists of 5 NM radius core surface area that goes up to 4,000 feet above the
airport elevation and a 10 NM radius shelf area that is no lower than 1,200 feet
to 4,000 feet above the airport elevation.
Class D Airspace. "Class D airspace extends upward from the surface
to 2,500 feet above the airport elevation (charted in MSL) surrounding those
airports that have an operational control tower" (U.S. Department of
Transportation, 2017, p. 3-2-8). The configuration of each Class D airspace like
13

Class A, B, and C are individually tailored, and whenever instrument
procedures are published, the airspace will generally be designed to contain the
procedures. Any class D surface may be designated as full-time (24-hour
operations) or part-time operation.
Class E Airspace. Class E airspace is controlled airspace that is
designated to serve a variety of terminal or en route purposes. In class E
airspace, pilot certification and specific equipment are not required with an
exception for any operation at a designated lower altitude.
U.S. Department of Transportation (2017) defines Class E as follows:
Class E airspace extends upwards from 14,500 feet MSL to, but not
including 18,000 feet MSL overlying 48 contiguous states including
Alaska, District of Columbia, the waters within 12 NM from the coast of
the 48 contiguous states and Alaska. Class E airspace excludes the
Alaska Peninsula west of longitude 160

00‘00‘‘W, airspace below

1,500 MSL above the surface of the earth unless specifically designed
lower (p. 3-2-9).
Class G Airspace. Class G airspace or uncontrolled airspace is that
portion of the airspace that is not designated as Class A, Class B, Class C, Class
D, or Class E airspace (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2017).
Special Use Airspace. Particular use airspace consists of that airspace
where any activities must be confined because of the nature of their operations
or because of limitations imposed upon the aircraft operations that are not
involved in any of those activities (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2017).
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Except for controlled firing areas (CFAs), all Special Use Airspace areas are
depicted on the aeronautical charts.
Prohibited and restricted areas are regulatory special use airspace
established in 14 CFR part 73 through the rule-making process. According to
the U.S. Department of Transportation (2017), "Warning areas, military
operations, alert areas, and controlled firing fall under non-regulatory special
use airspace. Special use airspace except for CFAs are charted on IFR or visual
charts and include the hours of operations, altitudes, and the controlling agency"
(p. 3-4-1).
Other Airspace Area. Another type of airspace area, particularly, in
terms of airport advisory and information services can be broken down into two
types:
1)

Local Airport Advisory (LAA)

2)

Remote Airport Information Service

LAA is available only in Alaska and is operated within 10 statute miles
of an airport where a control tower is not operating but where a flight service
stations (FSS) is located at an airport (U.S. Department of Transportation,
2017). At such locations near an airport, the FSS provides overall local airport
advisory services to all departing and arriving flights.
Other special airspace areas include military training routes, Temporary Flight
Restrictions, parachute jump aircraft operations, published VFR routes,
Terminal Radar Service Area, and Weather Reconnaissance Area.
Airport Classification
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The National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) is a federal
document that comprises all data related to the airports.
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation (2016):
In the NPIAS, there are 3,340 airports. This number includes the 3,332
existing airports and eight proposed airports that are planned to open
within five periods covered by the NPIAS (2017-2021) report. Public
entities own Ninety-eight percent of the airports that are included in the
NPIAS, and only 77 are privately owned (p. 3).
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation (2016), there are
two main categories of airports: Primary and non-primary. Primary airports are
any airports that are public airports receiving a scheduled air carrier service with
more than 10,000 or more enplaned passengers per year. Primary airports are
further categorized into four types consisting of large, medium, small and nonhub. Figure 3 shows the total number of airport present in each category.
Non-primary, on the other hand, are airports that are generally used by
general aviation (GA) aircraft. According to the U.S. Department of
Transportation (2016), ―Non-primary commercial service airports, i.e., any
airports receiving scheduled passenger service between 2,500 and 9,999
enplaned passenger per year, GA airports, and reliever airports fall under a nonprimary airport category" (p. 3). In total, there are 2,950 airports. Non-primary
airports are further categorized into national, regional, local, basic, and
unclassified.
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Primary Airports. There are a total of 382 primary airports in the U.S
(U.S. Department of Transportation, 2016). These airports fall into four
categories defined in statute as large, medium, small, and non-hub airports.
U.S. Department of Transportation (2016) state that ―Large hubs are
airports that each account for one percent or more of the total U.S. passenger
enplanements‖ (p. 5). Some of the passengers using large hubs as their origin
may fly from the local community while other passengers may be on connecting
flights. Large hub airports tend to have commercial airlines and freight
operations with minimal GA operations.

Figure 3: NPIAS Airports By Category, Total Number, And Use (U.S.
Department of Transportation, 2016, p. 3)
U.S. Department of Transportation (2016) defines medium hubs as
airports in the U.S. that account for between 0.25 percent and one percent of the
total U.S. passenger enplanements. Large hubs and medium hubs can
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sufficiently handle air carrier operations, but medium hubs also handle
substantial GA operations.
U.S. Department of Transportation (2016) defines "small hub airports as
airports that have enplanement of .05 percent to 0.25 percent of total U.S.
passenger enplanements" (p. 5). Currently, 72 small hub airports together
account for almost nine percent of total enplanements.
U.S. Department of Transportation (2016) state that "Non-hub primary
airports have an enplanement that is less than 0.05 percent of all commercial
passenger enplanement but has more than 10,000 annual enplanements" (p. 6).
At present, 249 non-hub primary airports together account for almost four
percent of all enplanements. These airports are generally used for GA activity
with an average of 95-based aircraft.
Non-Primary Airports. According to the U.S. Department of
Transportation (2016), Non-primary airports are generally used for GA
operations, which include 127 nonprimary commercial service, 259 relievers,
and 2,564 GA airports (p. 6). Non-primary airports are further categorized
depending upon their number and type of based aircraft, volume, and type of
flights.
Non-Primary airports are further grouped into five categories. These
categories are national, regional, local, basic, and unclassified. National airports
are located in the metropolitan area of a city and are easily accessible to nearby
business centers such as corporate headquarters, offices, and companies. They
support flying throughout the nation and the world. These airports provide
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excellent alternatives for busy primary airports. Primary airports are any
airports that are public airports receiving a scheduled air carrier service with
more than 10,000 or more enplaned passengers per year. The FAA has
designated 65 of these airports as relievers for primary airports (U.S.
Department of Transportation, 2016). National airports have a high activity of
jets and multiengine propeller aircraft.
Regional airports, such as national airports, are also located near
metropolitan areas and serve a large population and communities (U.S.
Department of Transportation, 2016). These airports primarily support the
regional economy, community, and business and have long-distance flights.
Regional airports have a high level of activity from jets and multiengine
propeller aircraft.
Local airports are an integral component for GA and provide nearby
communities efficient access to local and regional markets. According to the
U.S. Department of Transportation (2016), "these airports also accommodate
flight training and have moderate activity from multi-engine propeller aircraft"
(p. 7).
Basic airports fulfill the principal role of a community airport by serving
the GA community and linking GA with the national airport system. U.S.
Department of Transportation (2016) state ―In some cases, a basic airport is the
only way to access a community and provide emergency response access such
as medical, fire, and mail delivery services‖ (p. 7). These airports have activity
coming only from propeller aircraft and do not have jets using their facilities.
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Unclassified airports tend to have minimal activity. U.S. Department of
Transportation (2016) categories that out ―of the 199 public-owned unclassified
airports, 122 of these airports have up to three based aircraft and 78 of these
airports have four to eight based aircraft" (p. 8).
UAS
In recent years, the use of UASs has been steadily increasing. From
military to civil use, UASs have a place in today's demanding aviation industry.
As the use of UASs increase, it is essential to regulate their use. When UASs
are used for recreational activities such as aerial photography or video shooting,
or when UASs are flown as hobby near a busy airport, there is a risk of the UAS
flying in the path of departing or arriving flights. This can result in catastrophic
consequences if not properly monitored.
UAS classification
Specific definitions of UASs change with organizations and their use. In
general, UASs can be categorized in a variety of ways based on vehicle
attributes including the type of aircraft (fixed wing or rotorcraft), flight altitude
(high, medium, low), weight, and speed.
Different organizations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), Department of Defence (DoD), National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and State Regulatory Authority each have defined
groups or classes of UAS. Fladeland, Schoenung, and Lord (2017) state that
―most of these classifications are based on weight and altitude or speed‖ (p. 3).
While classification group nomenclature differs among these organizations,
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some specific weight limits are commonly used. The typical weight limits for
different classes of vehicles are 25 kg (55 lbs.), 150 kg (330 lbs.), and 600 kg
(1320 lbs.).
Fladeland et al. (2017) mention that ―the FAA has initially provided
regulations (14 CFR Part 107) for ―small UAS‖ operations for vehicles under
55 pounds, additional restrictions include a maximum speed of 87 knots and a
maximum altitude of 400 feet‖ (p. 3). The 55-pound weight limit has also been
historically used to define model aircraft in the U.S. Based on FAA interaction
with other organizations concerning the integration of UASs into the NAS, it is
expected that future FAA regulations will consider vehicle classes with weights
from 55 to 330 pounds, 330 to1320 pounds, and greater than 1320 pounds.
Integration of UAS into the NAS
The FAA, since the very beginning, is responsible for regulating civil
aviation and makes sure that adequate safety methods are put in practice.
According to the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
(2018), ―As means of ensuring that aviation operations are within acceptable
levels of risk, the FAA, as regulator, generally requires the following three
elements: A certified aircraft, a licensed pilot, and operational approval to
access specific airspace‖ (p. 9). The requirements are the same for any UAS that
operates in the National Airspace System. In addition to that, according to the
federal regulations, any UAS that is flown for recreational purposes are
considered according to the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and
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Medicine (2018). Currently, there are five ways in which a UAS can legally
operate in the NAS:
1)

As per 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 101.41, any
model aircraft that is flown for hobby or recreational use can
be operated in the NAS if it strictly follows safety guidelines
and other procedures under the advocacy of a communitybased organization (eCFR — Code of Federal Regulations,
n.d.a). In addition to that, the operation of the model aircraft
should not interfere with and should always give way to
manned aircraft with some operational limits. Certification of
the aircraft or licensed pilots are not required, and no
operational approval is needed to operate a model aircraft, but
notification of ATC may be required.

2)

In 2016, for small UAS rule compliant, the FAA published a
summary of small unmanned aircraft rule (Part 107) which
enabled UAS to be operated without the need for an
airworthiness certificate. UAS can be operated for a hobby,
recreational, commercial, public safety, or any other purpose in
the National Airspace System, but mentions that the remote
pilot in command must conduct a preflight check of the small
UAS to ensure that it is in a safe condition for operation (FAA,
2016e). Other requirements include that person operating a
small UAS must either hold a remote pilot airmen certificate
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with small UAS rating or be under the direct supervision of a
person who does hold a remote pilot certificate. Operational
limitations (allowed to operate below 400 feet above ground
level) and airspace where operations are permitted in the
airspace (Class G) are mentioned in summary.
3)

The 14 CFR 107.205 lists a number of provisions which
including prohibition of operation from a moving vehicle or an
aircraft, daytime only operations, requirement that the aircraft
remains in visual line of sight, visual observer, operations of
multiple small UAS by a single person, yielding the right way to
manned aircrafts, prohibition of operation over people and
operational limitations for small unmanned aircrafts (eCFR —
Code of Federal Regulations, n.d.b). As mentioned in the
previous paragraph, the airworthiness certificate may not be
required, but the operator may need to adhere to additional
operational limitations that are cited in the waiver application.

4)

For Small UAS rule airspace authorization, 14 CFR 107.41, it is
clearly stated the no person can operate an unmanned aircraft in
Class B, Class C, Class D airspace or within lateral boundaries
of the surface area of Class E airspace that is designated for an
airport use (eCFR — Code of Federal Regulations, n.d.c) unless
the person operating the UAS has proper authorization from the
ATC.
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5)

The Air Traffic Organization generally issues the Certificate of
Authorization (COA) or waiver to public sector operator (e.g.,
the military service, NASA, or public universities) for their
given specific need and activity (FAA, 2018f). Once the
organization applies, the FAA conducts a comprehensive
operational and technical review. Upon review, additional
restrictions may be given to the applicant for the safe operation
of their UAS within other airspace users.

One of the primary contributing factors to the concept of risk assessment
include vehicle and its system design (National Academy of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, 2018). This includes the operational risk associated
with operating the UAS, area of operation, separation from manned aircraft, and
human versus automation. For manned aircraft, assessment of risk is based on
the probability of crew and passenger fatalities, but that is not the case with
UAS operations, especially when integrated into the NAS. For a proper risk
assessment of UAS operations, different variables need to be considered such as
mission type, characteristics of the UAS, and other necessary environment
variables. Out of the several areas that address the risk associated with UAS
integration and in the context of safety risk management (SRM), the
classification of the UAS and where it will predominantly operate must be
described. Secondly, the hazards that are associated with operating and
integrating UAS need to be identified.
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An example of this is a lost link and failure to perform see and avoid.
After the identification of the hazard, risk needs to be analyzed. Threats posed
by UAS include harm to people on the ground or people in aircraft. The specific
risks associated with such threats are unknown and poorly approximated. The
risks luring from such threats need to be identified and mitigated. Mitigation
techniques such as flight termination systems, geofences, and minimum-risk
planning methods can be placed to enhance safety. Flight termination systems
are electronic systems available on the UAS that are capable of ending the
UAS's flight in a very controlled manner. Geofence on a UAS is a virtual
geographic barrier that is created for the UAS that controls the areas on which
the UAS can operate.
One of the first aspects of integrating UAS into the NAS is how ATC
will handle the presence of UAS activity in controlled airspace. Kamienski and
Semanek (2015) state that the main difference between a UAS and manned
aircraft is the remote location of the pilot operating the UAS. Instead of being
onboard, the pilot is in a different place that may or may not be near the current
location of the UAS. The majority of such UAS platforms operate in G Class
airspace and have a wide variety of use, for example, transmission line
inspection, real estate application, law enforcement, etc.
As mentioned before, the NAS is divided into several different classes
of airspaces. Currently, large UAS operations take place in Class A airspace.
There is a need for adequate regulation because aircrafts flying in the NAS are
required to see-and-avoid other aircraft. A pilot may be remotely located when
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operating a UAS making it impossible to fulfill a see-and-avoid, especially if
flying in the NAS. However, when aircraft are flying in Class A airspace, ATC
provides them with positive separation from other aircraft. This means that
UAS lack of ability to see-and-avoid other aircraft is not a major issue in Class
A airspace (Kamienski & Semanek, 2015). Congestion is another issue in the
NAS, but congestion widely varies from region to region, and UAS operations
generally take place in the uncongested region, which minimizes their impact
on ATC.
Kamienski and Semanek (2015) suggest that while UAS operations are
expected to change soon, the NAS will not remain the same. Also, if the UAS is
capable of meeting the airspace equipage requirement, it could fly in areas with
manned aircraft. Furthermore, the UAS operate in different ways than manned
aircraft. So it is essential for ATC to have all the information specific to the
UAS types and missions while flying in that airspace sector. All this
information can be provided through automation, briefings, training, reference
manuals, or other methods. Kamienski and Semanek discuss the need to
proceduralize the prioritization of UAS missions in the NAS versus other NAS
activities.
Clothier, Williams, and Washington (2015) developed a safety structure
for UAS operations near a populated area using a barrier bow-tie model. In the
case study, a remotely piloted aircraft system was operated in a university field
accessible to students and members of the public but not fully utilized. After the
selection of a site for the case study test, barriers were implemented as a way to
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mitigate risk. Barriers consist of the pre-flight checklist, system reliability
barrier, tactical terrain awareness barrier, failure recovery barrier, strategic
terrain awareness barrier, and impact barrier were implemented in the barrier
bow-tie model (BBT). From the evaluation using the BBT model, they were
able to develop a framework that provides a systematic means for evaluating all
the controls, which are not just limited to the technical airworthiness of the
system. The framework that is developed in the study is not only useful in
understanding operational safety cases but also helpful in developing safety
regulations for a safe UAS operation.
In addition to developing a safety framework and a formal framework
for integration of the UAS into the NAS, regulations are also needed to
implement a developed framework. The NAS, as mentioned in the previous
paragraph, is in place to ensure the safety of aircraft that fly through it, but with
an increase in traffic, the FAA estimates that air traffic will increase one percent
per year for the next 21 years making it necessary to make NAS regulations
more stringent (Maddox & Stuckenberg, 2015).
With UASs having an increasing presence, Congress passed the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 to improve aviation safety and capacity
(Maddox and Stuckenberg, 2015). The Act also instructs the government to
develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the integration of the civil
UAS into the NAS. Maddox and Stuckenberg state that drone integration is
problematic due to its regulatory impediments to their operations and the
resulting political climate. All UASs are restricted to below 400 feet above
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ground level or Special Uses Airspace. These restrictions are in place because
of the hazards these drones might pose to manned aircraft and the public.
Despite the implementation of regulatory measures, inadequate safety
systems have slowed down the integration of the UAS into the NAS.
Particularly, three technological aspects have been the forerunners for
challenging the integration of UAS consisting of sense and avoid system
(SAA), control and communication link, and general UAS safety (Maddox &
Stuckenberg, 2015).
In 2014, an American Airlines group regional jet in Florida nearly
collided with a drone at 2,300 feet (Maddox & Stuckenberg, 2015). The
operating limit for a drone is 400 feet off the surface. A collision at 2,300 feet
would have resulted in severe consequences. This particular incident
underscores the need for SAA and highlights the need to make the operation of
UAS in NAS safer.
According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (2011),
A key factor in safely integrating UAS in non-segregated airspace will
be their ability to act and respond as manned aircraft do. Much of this
ability will be subject to technology that provides the ability of the
aircraft to be controlled by the remote pilot and to act as a
communications relay between the remote pilot and ATC (p. 5).
The technology must also have a high degree of performance such as
transaction time and continuity of the communications link as well as the
timeliness of the aircraft‘s response to ATC instructions. This still leaves the
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question of how to integrate UAS into the NAS. Integration may result in
significant provocative changes or the addition of new regulations, legislation,
and technological issues. Amongst these, most significant obstacles are
inadequate safety systems, inadequate statute, and incomplete threat analyses.
Current criminal, civil, and regulatory provisions are inadequate for efficient
determination of hazardous use of UAS.
Integration of UAS at Airports
For the integration of UAS into airports, we have to keep in mind that
each airport is unique in terms of operation and its layout. Similar is the case
with UAS; each one is unique in terms of their operational capabilities
(Neubauer, Fleet, Grosoli, Verstynen, 2015). Therefore, it is necessary to
analyze each system separately keeping in mind their size, performance,
operational qualification, operating procedures, and emergency
profiles/procedures. Over the last couple of years, airports have started bringing
UAS business and operations to their facilities. After initial operations at
civilian as well as military airports, it was suggested by Neubauer et al. that "in
many ways unmanned aircraft can be treated just like manned aircrafts‖ (p. 11).
Killen-Fort Hood Regional Airport (GRK), in addition to being a
military airport, has 26 daily commercial flight, and also has two UAS flying
into the airport at least four days a week (Neubauer et al., 2015). For safe
operations of UAS at its facility, GRK has taken steps such as airline-UAS
schedule deconfliction where the UAS is operating out of GRK use notice to
airmen (NOTAM) to keep other flying parties and airlines operating out of the
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airport of any UAS operations. Lost link loiter point planning is done in such a
way that it does not interfere with the airport's traffic term and is usually
selected over a non-populated area. Another valuable lesson that can be learned
from UAS operations at GRK is training. Many ground operations personnel
may not have an aviation background, and although fully versed with safety
practice for manned aircraft, they might not be fully aware of additional safety
procedures needed when a UAS is using the same facility as a manned aircraft.
Stark Aerospace Similar to steps taken at GRK, Golden Triangle Airport (GTR)
in Lowndes County, Mississipi, in order to ensure safe operations of UAS at its
facility, has placed communications antenna to make sure that there is adequate
line-of-sight ground communication when a UAS is taxiing. At GRK, the UAS
is primarily operated by the military for their routine operations like flight
testing while UAS operations at GTR are primarily carried out with Israeli
Aerospace Industries (IAI) Heron Aircraft by Stark Aerospace which is a
defense contractor specializing in UAS use for military operations.
The same steps as taken for UAS integration into NAS must be taken for
integration at airports. According to Neubauer et al. (2015), ―the introduction of
UAS operations, in most cases, will represent a system change to an airport.
This change to the system is not ordinary and may require some distinctly
different ways in which aircrafts are operated‖ (p. 45). After a change has been
introduced in the system, the next step is to initiate a safety risk assessment
(SRA) to identify anticipated hazards and assess the associated risk that will
eventually help the airport and the UAS operator. The process for the assessing
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system change risk is the same process used for UAS integration into NAS.
This process is to define the system, which identifies the element and the
stakeholders where the UAS will be operating. The next step is the
identification of hazards due to the operation of UAS at an airport, after the
identification of hazards, risks associated with the hazards need to be analyzed.
Once the risks are identified, the next step is to assess the risk which means that
the risk is defined by their severity and likelihood. A combination of severity
and likelihood provides the level of risk. After the risk is assessed, the final step
is to take steps and put controls to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level. It is
essential to know that the threats that may arise due to UAS operations in the
NAS and airports largely depends upon the type of operations, the category of
the UAS, and availability of adequate standard operating procedures (SOP).
UAS has already started taking their place in the aviation industry but still must
go through a myriad of challenges in the forms of tests, risk and hazard
assessment, risk analyses, innovations, improvements, regulations, and
legislation to see themselves properly integrate into the NAS and airports.
Bow-tie Method
The bow-tie method did not develop on its own. Four historical
developments in risk assessment preceded bow-tie. They are as follows: Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Cause Consequence
Diagram, and Barrier Thinking (De Ruijter & Guldenmund, 2016). Risk
analysis is a proper systematic approach that involves both qualitative and
quantitative information integrated that provides information on potential
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causes, consequences, and likelihood of adverse events (Ferdous,
Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte, & Veitch, 2013). The likelihood for any event can be
referred to as a quantitative measure of an occurrence expressed by frequency or
probability of when an event can happen. A bow-tie diagram, as
aforementioned, comprises of FTA and ETA. These two methods are one of the
most common methods used from a risk analysis perspective. Ferdous et al.
(2013) mention that FTA develops a graphical interpretation that explores the
relationship between causes and occurrences for any undesired event. This
event is generally termed as a top event. ETA, like FTA, develops a graphical
model of consequences that consider the undesired event as an initiating event,
and from that identifies possible outcomes from that particular event.
Both FTA and ETA investigate the cause and its subsequent
consequence of an event for a system. A bow-tie diagram, also a visual tool,
made up of both FTA and ETA on the left and right side of the diagram
representing the risk control parameters such as causes, consequences, and
threats (Ferdous et al., 2013). The quantitative analysis of a bow-tie diagram
determines the likelihood of the undesired event as well as the outcome.
Typically, when the bow-tie method is used, it first starts with an FTA,
where potential incidents are identified, essentially analyzing necessary preconditions. In the next step, ETA occurs in the opposite direction to identify the
chain of events between the occurrences of the incident and any final undesired
consequence (Targoutzidis, 2010). Once these two steps are completed, the next
step is to identify safety barriers. Safety barriers are identified in both
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directions, before the incident, and after the incident either to prevent the
incident from developing into an accident or to prevent it from happening at all.
History
The Royal Dutch/Shell group first developed the bow-tie concept.
Acfield and Weaver (2012) state that ―It was intended to provide the user a
means by which risk information could be provided graphically" (p. 6). The
name bow-tie comes from the diagram once completed resembling the shape of
a bow-tie as shown in Figure 4. Over the years, many industries such as Oil and
Gas exploration and production, chemical processing, defense and security,
shipping, packing and logistics, medical, mining, and aviation have started
using bow-tie as a method to understand and evaluate risk.
Components of Bow-tie Diagram
Every bow-tie has a single hazard and a top event. For the top event,
threats associated with it and their subsequent consequences are pictorially
represented. In a bow-tie, the term hazard is defined as an activity such as an
aircraft flying and a top event is an event such as an engine failure. The top
event in a bow-tie is a direct result of a hazard. To justify the use of these
definitions, when an aircraft is flying, it is a potential hazard where many
undesired events can occur. For example, an engine failure or turbulence is an
undesired event that can occur and lead to unwanted consequences. Therefore,
there can be multiple bow-ties for a hazard with several top events.
After the identification of the hazard and the top event, the next step is
the identification of threats. In a bow-tie, threats can be internal as external.
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After the identification of threats, consequences are identified. Consequences
can be defined as an outcome that is, in any way, related to the top event
(Acfield & Weaver, 2012). Once all the associated hazards and top events for a
case are identified, the level of risk associated with that particular top event can
be evaluated. Once the threats and the consequences are defined, the next step
in a bow-tie is to define barriers. Barriers, in general, can be defined as a fence
or an obstacle that prevents movement or progress, or access. Keeping in mind,
the context that we are using, the barrier can be defined as a preventive measure
that can be implemented in a system to mitigate the effects of a threat or a
consequence occurring due to the top event.

Figure 4: Components of a Bow-Tie Diagram.
Hollnagel (2008) suggests that the best way to ensure the state of safety
is either to prevent something from happening or to protect its consequence.
Because it is impossible to prevent unwanted events or eliminate risks, these
two approaches are best if used together. In doing so, the two primary types of
responses, prevention, and protection involve the use of a barrier. When
considering different types of barriers, there are several types of barriers that
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can be used and depend on the type of risk assessment. Examples of barriers
include Social barriers, Organizational barriers, Hardware barriers, Cultural
barriers, Behavioral barriers, and Human barriers. Once barriers are identified,
the next step is to identify what these barriers are and what they do. The
function of a barrier is described as the modes or way in which it is possible to
prevent or to protect against any unwanted or uncontrolled propagation of
information (Hollnagel, 2008). After the identification of the barrier, escalation
factors are identified. Denny and Pai (2016) describe escalation factors as any
weakness or vulnerabilities that can lead to a breach in the barrier. Escalation
factors can also act as a failure mode for a specific barrier that has been
implemented on the barrier. It is also the sequence of threats which can be lead
to the top event. Figure 4 shows what a basic bow-tie diagram looks like. The
barrier systems describe how the barrier functions are carried out. Four barrier
systems can be identified and discussed in Table 1.
A principal advantage of using bow-tie is that it provides a proper, easy
to understand visual representation of risk, which not only includes each
applicable element, but also the relationship that exists between them. It also
identifies areas of concern such as inadequately controlled threats or
consequences for further treatment and study. Acfield and Weaver (2012) state
that visualization of the interactions between risk elements allows the
representation to be more readily comprehended and understood because most
individuals are not experts in the area of risk and but instead experts in the
applicable subject matter (e.g., ATC). This is crucial if risk management is to be
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an activity undertaken by those who are accountable for safety rather than being
outsourced to a safety department.
Table 1.
Barrier system
Barrier System
Physical

Functional

Symbolic

Barrier Function
The primary function of the
barrier is to contain or protect.
This barrier is mostly a physical
entity.
The main function of this barrier
system is to prevent movements
or activities.

Example
Safety belts or
harnesses, fences,
filters, etc.

The main function of this barrier
is to counter or prevent actions.

Demarkations, labels
& warnings,
clearance, approval,
etc.
Rules and regulations,
SOPs, etc

Incorporeal

Distance, persistance,
pre-conditions,
synchronization, etc.

The primary function of this
barrier is to comply or conform to
rules, guidelines, or regulations
Note. Adapted from ―Risk + barriers = safety?‖, by Hollangel, E., 2008, Safety
Science, 46, p. 224.
Bow-tie in Healthcare
As mentioned in previous paragraphs, bow-tie finds its use in many
industries, for example, in healthcare. Mcleod and Bowie (2018) mention
several examples where bow-tie has been used to evaluate risk assessment.
Bow-tie analysis has been previously used to assess the risk associated with
critical events in intensive care units. In this particular case, nine different bowties were generated covering three hazardous situations. In that analysis, there
have been 84 barriers identified that were not implemented and led to 37
recommendations for improvements. Concerning the barriers that were missing,

36

it was determined that these barriers were never considered when protocols
were composed.
Bow-tie in Oil & Gas Industry
Bhopal gas tragedy was one of the worst gas industry disasters. Vaughen
and Kenneth (2016) used the bow-tie diagram in addition to process hazard
analysis to see which preventive measures could have been taken at the facility
where the tragedy took place. In the paper, process hazard analysis (PHA) was
combined with a bow-tie diagram to illustrate barriers that could have been
placed in order to prevent leakage.
Bow-tie in Aviation
Recently bow-tie has also found its use in the aviation industry
especially when it comes to safety. Cui, Zhang, Ren, and Chen (2018) have
developed a new aviation safety index and its solution under uncertainty
condition using the bow-tie model. The bow-tie model is broken down into the
following steps:
-

The top event of the FTA is the initial event of the FTA, and it is
the critical event of the model as well.

-

The fault tree and event tree are connected by the common critical
event.

-

All the same accident causations and basic events are located to the
left of the model.

-

The accident consequences are located to the right of the model.
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-

All the branches in the left always gather to the critical event, and
in the right, all the consequence are extended from the critical
event.

Once a proper procedure was set, Cui, Zhang, Ren, and Chen (2018)
takes an aviation-based scenario, maps it onto a bow-tie diagram and then
introduces the Monte-Carlo computational method, a computerized
mathematical technique that allows researchers to account for risk in
quantitative analysis and decision making, and generates an aviation safety
index. From the bow-tie diagram and the computational results, the proposed
aviation safety index can describe the aircraft safety and evaluate the influence
of uncertainty of different factors in aviation actions and is more direct than
traditional safety indexes.
The bow-tie model has also been used to research on a controlled flight
into terrain risk (CFIT) analysis (Wang, Wan, and Miao, 2018). CFIT flights
generally occur under instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), flight at
night, or both conditions under deplorable visibility conditions. A primary
reason attributed to the pilot's lack of environmental awareness concerning the
aircraft's vertical and horizontal position relative to the ground, surface, or any
other object. Wang et al. (2018) state that the loss of situational awareness is the
leading cause of CFIT accidents. From the results, and after the completion of
the bow-tie diagram the data obtained was crucial in pointing which factors
played a hand in CFIT. Other factors such as Ground proximity warning system
GPWS warning, high approach speed, deviation, of course, deviation of glide,
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landing and descent rate of non-landing configuration also played a role in
CFIT, particularly, at airports.
Content Analysis
For the analysis in the current study, content analysis will be performed.
The study methodology will be described in Chapter 3. However, it is briefly
explained in this section. According to Krippendorf (2004), "Content Analysis
is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or
other meaningful matter) to the context of their use" (p. 18). Elo and Kyngäsh
(2008) state that content analysis can be used as a method of analyzing
documents and allows the researcher to test theoretical issues that help
understand the data, and most importantly, according to Elo and Kyngäsh,
"Content analysis as a research method is a systematic and objective means of
describing and quantifying phenomena" (p. 108). One of the main aims of
content analysis is to attain a concise and broad description of the phenomenon.
The outcome from the content analysis is categories or concepts that help the
researcher come up with a model or a conceptual system. According to Okumus
and Kevin (2007), "It can provide rich and in-depth accounts on a wide range of
topics. It establishes categories and then counts the number of related words,
sentences and issues under each category" (p. 81).
When data is collected, the primary purpose of data analysis is to
organize and elicit meaning from the collected data and present realistic
conclusions (Bengtsson, 2016). One of the reasons for selecting qualitative
content analysis is that the method, from the data, presents the findings in words
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or themes which in turn helps the researcher in drawing necessary
interpretations of the results.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Introduction
This chapter presents the methodology for the current study. It provides
information on the research design, approach used for the design, data
collection, instrumentation and materials, and data analysis.
As the use of UAS has steadily increased, there is a necessity to evaluate
the associated hazards and risks. The data collected for this study is from the
ASRS and NTSB reports from two aviation incidents, and accidents report
portals. This research addresses the problem of identifying any risk and barriers
that can be used as a defense to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level with the
integration of UAS into the NAS and airports
Research Design. The research design used for the study is qualitative
content analysis. One of the primary purposes of using qualitative content
analysis is that archival data from two primary UAS incidents and accidents
report databases have been used for this study. The reason for selecting archival
data is that the information selected from the reports are accurate to its form and
do not have an anomaly. If interviews or surveys were instead used to collect
information, the questions would have focused on errors or mistakes done by
the participants when operating UASs. However, participants might not be
truthful in their responses leading to inaccurate results and limited
generalizability of the study findings. The approach of the design is instead in
the development of themes using content analysis through analyzing reports.
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Each report was thoroughly analyzed, and contributing factors reported. Once
the contributing factors from each report were collected, the contributing factors
were grouped into categories from the most frequently occurring contributing
factors and probable cause(s) displayed in the bow-tie diagram. One of the main
advantages of using bow-tie diagrams is that it is a visual tool in representing
risks associated with the integration of UAS in the NAS and airports. It assists
in displaying barriers that reduce the risk to an acceptable level.
Research methodology. The purpose of the study was to utilize a
qualitative content analysis. The qualitative research component for this
research study utilized archival data found in ASRS and NTSB reports aviation
incidents and accidents report portals. Access to this archival data was publicly
available through the ASRS and NTSB websites. There are advantages and
disadvantages in selecting a content analysis. According to Vitouladiti (2014),
the advantages of content analysis are:


Useful to study written document, graphics, and videos.



Widely used and understood as a research methodology.



Helps in understanding trends exhibited by a group or collection
of documents.



Useful for analyzing archival material and documents.



It is easily repeated or changed if a problem arises.



Establishes reliability and is easy and straightforward.
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Of all the other research methods, content analysis is the easiest
to replicate as the materials used for any previous studies can be
made readily available.

There are also disadvantages of using a content analysis that consist of:


Content analysis is a purely descriptive method describing what
is out there and does not point to the underlying cause of the
observed trend or pattern.



The reach of the analysis is limited to the material used for data
collection.

Data collection. The first step conducted after the committee approval
and Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was to collect data on UAS
incidents and accidents reports from the ASRS and NTSB Aviation Accident
Database and Synopses. Then, the data was coded and recoded using the
instrument in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively. Data categories
analyzed within the reports consisted of the flight phase, airspace class, flight
conditions, summary of the event, and contributing factors from the ASRS
reports. For the NTSB reports, the data categories analyzed were the narrative
analysis and probable cause and findings. For the ASRS reports, the data
categories analyzed were flight plan, flight phase, flight conditions, airspace
class, event, and contributing factor.
Bengstton (2016) states that ―Content analysis can be used on all types
of written text no matter where the material came from‖ (p. 10). Ison (2018)
states that content analysis is used as a method to uncover common information
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in the literature. This particularly bodes well with the need for the current study
because, from the reports and records that were garnered from the website,
common information was filtered out that was an indication of a contributing
factor or the primary cause of the UAS incidents and accidents.
The ASRS website provides a user friendly interface where the user can
look at incidents and accidents depending on various categories such as model
of aircraft, date range, location, environment, and event assessment wherein the
user can look up different types of event type, for example, airspace violations,
aircraft equipment problem, ATC issue, etc. For data collection, UAS incidents
and accidents reports were searched on from January 2008 to January 2018.
Under the aircraft model, the unpiloted aerial vehicle was selected. After the
information mentioned above was inputted into the search criteria, the search
was carried out. From the search, a total of 108 records were generated. The
records were then exported into an excel file for further examination.
A similar procedure was utilized for collecting data from the NTSB
website. On the NTSB website, the aviation accident online database was
accessed. Then, the January 2008 to January 2018 date range was selected for
the search. One of the limitations on the website was that there was no option
available to select only reports with UAS, UAV, and drone as the aircraft
make/model. Instead, the event detail section was selected, and a specific word
string was entered consisting of UAS, UAV, and drone in both singular and
plural forms to generate all reports that contained one or more of these terms. In
total, six searches were carried out, and after careful examination of the
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generated reports, it was found that half of the reports were without information
about UAS accidents and incidents. In order to get the most accurate data from
the reports, each report was carefully analyzed regarding the nature of the
narrative. Reports without information regarding UAS incidents and accidents
were discarded. After discarding all the unnecessary reports, there were 18
NTSB reports identified bringing the total number of combined ASRS and
NTSB reports to 126 reports.
Instrumentation and Materials
Instruments. To investigate and analyze data, this research employed a
quantitative data collection instrument. Data collection for this methodology
utilized the content analysis instrument forms located in Appendix A and B.
Appendix A has the instrument for ASRS and Appendix B for NTSB. The data
collected consisted of the flight phase, airspace class, flight conditions,
summary of the event, and contributing factors for ASRS reports. The data
collected consisted of narrative analysis and probable cause and findings for the
NTSB reports.
Materials. Two types of reports were used for data collection. The
reports from the ASRS consisted of technical as well as regulatory aspects of
the UAS incidents and accidents. The reports from the NTSB consisted of a
brief narrative of the incidents and accidents and listed the probable cause and
findings for the reported incidents and accidents.
BowTieXP (CGE Risk Management Solutions, n.d.) software was used
as a tool for a visual representation to display the data. Different bow-tie
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diagrams were created based on contributing factors identified from the two
portals. The bow-tie diagrams display and identify barriers. The barriers were
brainstormed for each threat identified from the contributing factors and are in
the bow-tie diagram. Once the barriers were identified, the software displayed
the escalation factors for each identified barrier. Escalation factors as mentioned
in Chapter 2 are defined as any deficiencies or loopholes that could lead to a
barrier failure. After integration of the threats and consequences, the software
tool provided a display of the risks associated with the integration of UAS into
the NAS and at airports. Contributing factors and probable cause(s) were
identified from the reports and were incorporated into individual bow-tie
diagrams to provide multiple diagrams for each contributing factors and
probable cause(s).
Data Analysis
The next step after relevant reports were identified was to begin the
content analysis.
Content analysis, as given by Bernard, Wutich, and Ryan (2017), can be
carried out by the following steps:
-

Devise a research question and corresponding hypothesis, which
is based on an existing theory or prior research.

-

Select a set of texts to test the question or hypothesis.

-

Create a set of codes comprised of variables and themes in the
research question or hypothesis.
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-

Pretest the variable on a few of the selected texts. After the
pretest is carried out, any problems that arise about codes and the
coding needs to be made consistent for the entire process of
coding.

-

Apply the code to the text (p. 245).

The next step is to select relevant text from the reports to identify the
unit of analysis. Unit of analysis refers to the part of the selected text, document
or other relevant data will be coded to analyzed (Bernard, Wutich, and Ryan,
2017).
This same technique was used for the analysis of the UAS incidents and
accidents reports. The majority of the reports, in their format, had a contributing
factor and probable cause section where the issuing organizations mentioned the
reasons why the incidents and accidents had occurred. From this section,
contributing factors and probable causes were used for the next step, i.e., to
create a set of codes. For the current study, the code will be the categories that
were created in the instrument form. One key advantage of using this procedure
was that it brings to light which contributing factors and probable cause(s) have
a high frequency of occurrence and ensures that whatever pattern or sequence of
events found in the reports can be generalized.
The third step is coding. Coding is nothing but a short phrase or a
summary that is picked from the report or the selected document. For the
current study, different themes were created by using the HFACS to code
contributing factors and probable cause(s). The HFACS categories are divided
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into four main categories: Organizational Influences, Unsafe Supervision,
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, and Unsafe Acts and the four categories and
their sub-categories are displayed in Figure 5 (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).
These categories and sub-categories provide in-depth information on particular
deficiencies in an organization and are discussed below:
1. Organizational influence:
a. Organizational Climate (OC): OC looks at the overall
running of the organization. Things such as organization
policies, command structure, and organization climate
fall under this category.
b. Operational Process (OP): OP analyses the process by
which an organization carries out its day-to-day
operations.
c. Resource Management (RM): RM describes how the
organization uses its resources such as workforce,
finances, and equipment that aid in their day-to-day
operations.
2. Unsafe Supervision:
a. Inadequate supervision (IS): IS analyses oversight in the
management of organization personnel among other
resources.
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b.

Planned Inappropriate Operations (PIO): PIO looks into
the management and assignment of work that includes
but is not limited to risk management and crew pairing.

c. Failed to Correct Known Problems (FCP): FCP looks
into a deficiency identified in an organization, but no
adequate corrective measures are taken to rectify any
identified deficiency.
d. Supervisory Violations (SV): Any existing rules and
regulations, instructions, the standard operating
procedure that is disregarded or not taken seriously fall
under SV.
3. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts:
a.

Environmental Factors:
I.

Technological Environment (TE): TE includes issues
that are related to the design of equipment, user
interface, checklist layout, and automation.

II.

Physical Environment (PhyE): PhyE highlights the
operational setting such as the weather, altitude,
terrain, and other environmental condition such as
heat during the operation is carried out.

b. Condition of Operator:
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I.

Adverse Mental States (AMS): AMS looks into the
psychological or mental conditions that affect
performance such as mental fatigue, misplaced
motivation, and anxiety.

II.

Adverse Physiological States (APS): APS is medical
and physiological conditions that affect performance
such as illness, intoxication, medical condition, etc.

III.

Physical/Mental Limitations (PML): PML highlights
permanent physical or mental disabilities that can
affect performance such as poor vision, low physical
strength to complete an assigned task, and other
mental illnesses.

IV.

Personnel Factors Communication, Coordination, &
Planning (CC): CC includes communication,
coordination and teamwork issues that harm
performance.

V.

Fitness for Duty (PR): PR includes crew rest periods,
alcohol restrictions, and other off-duty restrictions.

4. Unsafe Acts:
a. Errors
I.

Decision Errors (DE): DE looks into the errors that
occur as part conscious and goal-intended behavior
but may prove to be inadequate for the situation in
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which it is used. These errors generally arise due to
poorly executed procedures, improper choices, or a
misunderstanding of available information.
II.

Skill-Based Errors (SBE): SBE are any highly
practiced behavior that usually occurs with little to
no conscious thought. These errors generally occur
in unintentional deactivation of switches, elapsed
intentions, or omitted items from the checklist.

III.

Perceptual Errors (PE): PE are errors that arise when
the personnel's sensory input is degraded, for
example, when flying in the dark, poor weather
conditions or poor visibility conditions. These errors
generally result in misjudgment from the crew.

b. Violations:
I.

Routine Violations (RV): RV focuses on violations
that happen to be habitual by nature. These errors
generally arise when the management of the
organization allows violations from the established
rules and regulation to occur.

II.

Exceptional Violations (EV): EV are violations that
are neither typical of the personnel nor condoned by
the management.
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Figure 5: HFACS Categories and Sub-Categories (Adapted from Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2000)
Some of the themes that can be used to identify the HFACS category
include mechanical failure, human factors, airspace violation, etc. These
categories act as themes for the code. Once the themes are set, individual
contributing factors and probable cause(s) can be filtered to their respective
themes. This procedure was first used for reports from January 2008 to January
2013. After setting up the theme, reports were again carefully analyzed, and
contributing factors and probable cause(s) were sorted out based on their theme.
For pre-testing of variables, the reports were analyzed as part of creating
codes for consistency in the coding process in terms of filtering contributing
factors and probable cause(s) according to the themes. This was done by
selecting reports from January 2014 to January 2015, which were not part of
reports used to develop the code. The same procedure was used to create themes
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from the validation years. Once themes were developed, they were crosschecked with themes from original reports to make sure that there was adequate
consistency in the process of coding. The coding process took around 10 days to
complete.
Once the coding procedure was made consistent with the themes for the
contributing factor and probable cause categorization, the next step was to
implement the derived procedure for reports from January 2008 to January
2018.
The final step was to create the bow-tie diagrams. After the categories
were created from the reports and relevant contributing factors and probable
cause(s) were sorted out, the final analysis was carried out to form bow-tie
diagrams. Per the first research question, the contributing factors or probable
cause risks were identified from the bow-tie diagrams. This was done for each
identified category. Once the risks were identified from the bow-tie diagram,
the second research question was answered by brainstorming adequate and
relevant barriers in the bow-tie diagram, which will act as a control towards the
threat and will mitigate the risk.
Summary
In order to conduct the current study, qualitative content analysis was
used as the research methodology. The main reason for using qualitative content
analysis was to develop themes from the data collected from the ASRS and
NTSB reports. The ASRS and NTSB portal steps were discussed in this chapter
that describes how the reports were collected. Once, all the available reports
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were collected, two instrument forms were developed, one for the ASRS reports
and one for the NTSB reports. The data contained in these reports were used to
develop themes to determine the most frequently recurring contributing factor
and probable cause(s) for UAS accidents and incidents identified in the reports.
Once these themes were developed, the next step was to include them in the
bow-tie diagrams. The bow-tie diagrams are visual tools in understanding the
threats and consequences that are associated with UAS integration. From the
identified threats and consequences, the software assists in the identification of
barriers to bring the level of risk to an acceptable level.
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Chapter 4
Results
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to determine the risks that are associated
with integrating UAS in the NAS and airports. The methodology for this study
consisted of using qualitative content analysis to identify the HFACS category
for the most frequently occurring contributing factor and probable cause(s) for
UAS incidents and accidents that were reported in the ASRS and NTSB
database.
Data Analysis
NTSB and ASRS reports were analyzed to identify discrepancies that
needed to be discarded. Discrepancies consisted of reports that did not have
information relevant to UAS incidents or accidents. Next, the unit of analysis
was defined which referred to the parts of a text or other relevant data that were
coded and analyzed (Bernard, Wutich, and Ryan, 2017). This unit can be a
single word, sentence, paragraph, or whole document (Zhang & Wildermuth,
n.d.). The unit of analysis selected for the current study was a complete report
from the NTSB and ASRS database. The next step consisted of creating a set of
codes. The set of codes were included in the instrument form. Due to the
difference in the format of the NTSB and ASRS reports, two different set of
codes were developed based on the research question and the data available in
the reports. The NTSB reports were coded based on the narrative analysis,
probable cause(s), and findings. The ASRS reports were coded based on the
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flight conditions, flight plan, flight phase, airspace class, and contributing
factors. For the pre-test of the set of codes, a total of five reports from NTSB
and ASRS were selected. The information that was available from these five
reports were included in their respective instrument forms. Once the data
collection was completed for the pre-test, the instrument forms were analyzed to
ensure that the necessary information was being collected. After the initial
analysis, the instrument forms were recoded to include more variables such as
the contributing factors, and HFACS category and subcategory. The
information regarding the reasoning behind the addition of more variables on
the instrument form is provided in the next section. The four HFACS main
categories were listed in the instrument form as provided by Shappell and
Wiegmann (2000). It was determined during the pre-test that the reports needed
to be analyzed at the HFACS sub-category level in order to better identify the
contributing factors of the incident and accident.
After the pre-test of coding the reports, HFACS sub-categories were
added to the instrument forms to ensure complete analysis of information
extracted from the reports. After this change was finalized, the NTSB and
ASRS reports were thoroughly analyzed using the instrument forms. Each
report was carefully studied to look for the information that could fit in their
respective instrument forms. A detailed analysis using the instrument forms was
conducted to determine the HFACS category of the most frequently occurring
contributing factor leading to UAS incidents and accidents. Table 2 displays a
summary of the results showing the number of reports identified within
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different HFACS category and sub-category. For the NTSB reports, OP and TE
were most frequently occurring HFACS sub-category. For the ASRS reports,
TE, SBE, and EV were the most frequently occurring sub-category.
Table 2
Number of NTSB and ASRS Reports with HFACS Category

HFACS Category
Organizational
Influence
OC
OP
RM
Unsafe Supervision
IS
PIO
FCP
SV
Preconditions of
Unsafe Acts
TE
PhyE
AMS
APS
PML
CC
PR
Unsafe Acts
DE
SBE
PE
RV
EV
HFACS Category
N/A

Number of
NTSB
Reports

Number of
ASRS Reports

2
6
0

2
4
0

1
0
0
0

9
1
13
1

4
2
1
0
0
0
0

20
4
3
0
0
9
0

0
1
2
0
1
0

10
20
1
2
21
4
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A detailed description of the data analysis for the NTSB and ASRS
reports is contained in the next two sections of this chapter.
NTSB Data Analysis
After the pre-test of the NTSB instrument form, the instrument was recoded to include aircraft issues, personnel issues, and environmental issues in
addition to the HFACS categories and sub-categories. During the pre-test, it was
also found that two reports were repeated twice and thrice respectively, but with
different accident numbers. Each report had information that was not provided
in the alternate versions of the report, and therefore all the reports about the
same accident were analyzed as if it was all part of the same report to eliminate
the repetition. This brought the total number of NTSB reports to 12 reports
analyzed using the NTSB instrument form. During the analysis, it was found
that three reports suggested that aircraft issues were not connected with the
cause of the incident or accident, seven reports suggested that environmental
issues did not have a role in the incident or accident, and three reports suggested
that personnel issues did not have a role in the incident or accident as shown in
Table 3. After eliminating all the factors that did not have a role in the incident
or accident, the next step was to categorize according to the HFACS category or
sub-category of the contributing factors and probable cause(s) of the incident or
accident. To identify the HFACS category, all the listed causes and contributing
factors were extracted from the reports and listed on the instrument forms. After
all the relevant data was compiled and the final analysis was complete, there
were eight accounts of organizational influences as the HFACS category for
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contributing factors and probable cause(s). Preconditions for unsafe acts were
identified six times, unsafe acts were identified four times, and unsafe
supervision was identified two times. A summary of findings from the NTSB
reports is included in Table 2 From the final analysis, and it was concluded that
organizational influence was the most frequently recurring HFACS category for
contributing factors and probable causes of the incidents or accidents. After
identifying the most frequently occurring HFACS category, the next step was to
identify the sub-category under the organizational influence. From further
analysis of reports, six accounts of OP and two accounts of OC were found.
After the completion of data analysis for the NTSB reports, it was found that
organizational influence had a significant role in the contributing factor and
probable cause(s) for the incidents or the accidents, and OP was recognized as
the most frequently occurring sub-category under the organizational influence.
Table 3
NTSB Data Analysis Summary
Data Categories
Aircraft Issues
Personnel Issues
Environmental
Issues

Number of NTSB Reports
With
Without
9
3
9
3
5

7

ASRS Data Analysis
For the ASRS data analysis, the instrument form for data collection is
provided in Appendix A. After pre-testing of codes, it was found that not all
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relevant data was being extracted from the reports. Therefore, contributing
factors, flight conditions, and event categories were added to the instrument
form after the pre-test. The new instrument form was used to collect data from
all of the available reports from the ASRS database after the re-coding. During
the analysis, it was found that VMC conditions prevailed during UAS incidents
or accidents. In addition to the available flight condition information in the
reports, it was found that 37 reports had no information available for flight
conditions. A summary of flight condition data is presented in Table 4. Five
reports had identified IMC flight conditions while only two reports identified
mixed flight condition.
Table 4
ASRS Flight Condition Data Summary
Instrument Form Categories
Flight Conditions
Mixed
IMC
VMC
None
N/A

Number of Reports
2
5
64
0
37

From the analysis of flight plan data, it was found that IFR was
identified in 38 reports while VFR was identified in only eight reports.
Summary of flight plan data analysis is provided in Table 5. There were 38
reports were identified with no flight plan for their flights, and 25 reports had no
information available regarding the flight plan. The reason so many reports had
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no flight plan for their operation was that many incidents that were reported
with ASRS were from recreational use of a UAS.
Table 5
ASRS Flight Plan Data Summary
Instrument Form Categories Number of Reports
Flight Plan
IFR
VFR
None
N/A

37
8
38
25

Next, it was found that the majority of UAS incidents and accidents had
been reported during the cruise phase of flight. Summary of the flight phase is
provided in Table 6. Climb, descent and approach were identified in eight,
seven, and five reports respectively. One report had no flight phase information.
Table 6
ASRS Flight phase data summary
Instrument Form Categories
Flight Phase
Climb
Cruise
Landing
Approach
Take-off
Descent
None
Other

Number of Reports
8
77
2
5
2
7
1
3

After the analysis of the flight phase, data analysis of Airspace Classes
showed that the majority of incidents and accidents had occurred in Class A and
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Class G Airspace. Class E Airspace was identified in 20 reports. Summary of
Airspace Class is shown in Table 7. Class D was identified in 11 reports, and 12
reports did not have information regarding Airspace Class in which the incident
or the accident had occurred.
Table 7
ASRS Airspace Class Data Summary
Instrument Form Categories

Number of Reports

Airspace Class
Class A
Class B
Class C
Class D
Class E
Class G
Special Use Airspace
N/A

27
7
4
11
20
26
1
12

From the analysis of contributing factors from the instrument forms, it
was found that human factors were the major contributing factor for the cause
of UAS incidents and accidents. Summary of contributing factor data is
provided in Table 8. Other contributing factors that were most frequently
identified in the reports were aircraft problem, procedural error or deviation,
weather-related issues, airspace violation, equipment problem, chart or
publication information, company policy, and airports. Only one report was
without information for contributing factors.
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Table 8
ASRS Contributing Factors Data Summary
Instrument Form Categories
Contributing Factors
Human Factors
Aircraft
Equipment
Procedure
Weather
Airspace Violation
Chart or Publication
Company Policy
Airport
N/A

Number of Reports
63
30
7
44
13
10
6
4
2
1

The event category was further classified into four sub-categories:
anomaly, detector, when detected, and result of the event. From the analysis, it
was found that airspace violation and procedural deviation were identified in 40
reports. Summary of anomalies is provided in Table 9. ATC issue was
identified in 15 reports. Excursion from assigned altitude was identified in 11
reports. An airborne conflict was identified in 10 reports. Clearance problems
and equipment problems were identified in nine reports and loss of control of
UAS was identified in seven reports.
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Table 9
ASRS Event – Anomaly Data Summary
Instrument Form Categories
Event (Anomaly)
Procedure Deviation
Loss of Control of A/C
Airspace Violation
Clearance Issue
Equipment Problem
Excursion from Assigned Altitude
ATC Issue
Airborne Conflict

Number of Reports
40
7
40
9
9
11
15
10

From the instrument forms, it was found that the majority of reported
incidents and accidents were detected by the flight crew that was directly
involved with the flying of the UAS. Summary of detector data from the reports
is provided in Table 10. ATC detected the incident in 27 reports. The observer
was identified as a detector in eight reports. Other people or a third party
detected the event in seven of the reports. Ground personnel detected the
incident in six reports. Two reports identified automation as the detector while
four reports were without information on who detected the incident.
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Table 10
ASRS Events – Detector Data Summary
Instrument Form Categories
Event (Detector)
Flight Crew
ATC
Ground Personnel
Observer
Automation
Other Person
N/A

Number of Reports
55
27
6
8
2
7
4

Next, it was also found that the majority of the incidents and accidents
were detected in-flight. Table 11 provides a summary of when the incident was
detected.
Table 11
ASRS Events – When Detected Data Summary
Instrument Form Categories
Event (When detected)
In-flight
ATC
Routine Inspection
Service
Pre-flight
Other
N/A

Number of Reports
71
1
10
1
3
8
12

A routine inspection was identified in 10 reports. Pre-flight was
identified in three reports. Service and ATC were identified in one report. There
were 12 reports without information regarding when the incident was detected.
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After the incident or accident was detected, after the analysis, it was
found that no action had been taken for the majority of the incidents. Summary
of the results from the event of the incident is provided in Table 12. There were
19 reports that suggested that UAS was re-oriented after the event was detected.
New clearance was issued in 14 reports. Evasive action was taken in 11 reports.
Nine reports identified new advisory that issues to the flight crew as the result
of the incident. In six reports, ATC assisted the flight crew.
Table 12
ASRS Events – Results Data Summary
Instrument Form Categories
Event (Result)
None Reported Action Taken
Took Evasive Action
Advisory Issued
New Clearance Issued
Re-oriented UAS
Exited Penetrated Airspace
Flight Canceled
A/C Damaged
ATC Assistance
Regained Control of UAS
N/A

Number of Reports
37
11
9
14
19
4
2
6
6
5
7

Six reports identified that the aircraft was damaged as the result of the
incident. Five reports identified that the flight crew regained control of their
UAS while four reports identified that the flight crew exited the penetrated
airspace. Two reports identified that the flight was canceled. Seven reports were
without information regarding the result of the incident.
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After the analysis, it was found that unsafe acts were the most frequently
occurring HFACS category that was responsible for the cause of the reported
incident or accident. Out of all the reports, there were a total of four reports
without information regarding an HFACS category. Once the most frequently
occurring HFACS category was identified, the next step was to identify the
most frequently occurring HFACS sub-category. During the analysis, it was
found that SBE and EV had significant involvement in the UAS incidents and
accidents. Table 2 displays a summary of the ASRS data analysis. ASRS is an
FAA voluntary, confidential reporting system. From the analysis, it was found
that the majority of reports were filed by pilots who were flying their UAS for
recreational purposes. However, some were being flown under stringent
military regulations. From the analysis of the HFACS category for the most
frequently occurring contributing factors, the category of the unsafe act was
identified for the nature of the reported incident or accident while the
organizational influence had only been identified four times.
Summary
The results of this study suggest that from the NTSB data analysis, the
organizational influence was the most frequently occurring HFACS category for
the contributing factor and probable cause(s) for UAS incidents and accidents
while OP was identified as the most frequently occurring sub-category under
the organizational influence. The ASRS data analysis suggested that unsafe act
was the most frequently recurring HFACS category for the contributing factor
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and probable cause(s) for UAS incidents and accidents while SBE and EV were
identified as the most frequently occurring sub-category under unsafe acts.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
Research Summary
As the use of UAS is increasing across all industry sectors, chances of
mishaps have also increased. During the last few years, there have been several
incidents as well as accidents that involved a UAS either flying close to manned
aircraft or UAS flying in unauthorized airspace. Although not all mishaps have
been catastrophic, these incidents should not be taken lightly. Keeping in mind
the Swiss Cheese Model, it can be said that these incidents and accidents
occurred due to the lack of adequate defenses that could have mitigated risks
associated with operating UAS in the NAS and near airports.
The primary purpose of the current study was to identify the HFACS
category of the most frequently occurring contributing factors and probable
cause(s) for UAS incidents and accidents using qualitative content analysis. For
data collection, UAS incident and accident reports were obtained from the
ASRS and NTSB databases, screened for UAS incidents or accidents, and
analyzed to identify the HFACS category.
After the data analysis was completed and the HFACS categories were
identified for the NTSB and ASRS reports, threats and consequences were
identified from the reports. The next step was to visually represent the identified
threats and consequences in a bow-tie diagram using Bow-TieXP software. The
bow-tie diagram for the NTSB and ASRS results are discussed in this chapter.
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Discussion
NTSB results. During the data collection, it was found that not all
reports obtained had useful information regarding UAS incidents or accidents.
All such reports were discarded, and only reports with information regarding
UAS incidents and accidents were used for the data analysis. From the data
analysis, it was found that the organizational factor was the most frequently
occurring HFACS category identified from the NTSB reports analyzed. Within
the organizational factor, OP was identified as the most frequently occurring
sub-category of organizational influence. The identified HFACS category is
appropriate for the NTSB reports that a majority of the reported incidents and
accidents were from federal agencies or defense contractors. The NTSB reports
were divided into several sections that identified every aspect of the reported
incident or accident. These included findings, history of flight, damage to
aircraft, personnel information, meteorological information, and aircraft
information. Out of all these sections, findings were useful in terms of
identifying contributing factors and probable cause(s) as it provided a summary
of aircraft issues, personnel issues, and organizational issues that were
associated in the reported incident or accident. However, not every report had
complete information in the findings section. Therefore, the narrative section of
the reports was also analyzed.
Although UAS operations for federal agencies are carried out under
adherence to regulation, it was found during the data analysis that
organizational influences played a significant role in the reported UAS incident
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or accident. These contributing factors consisted of pilot training, inadequate
risk management process, task scheduling, its associated workload, pilot‘s
incomplete knowledge of regulation and safe operating practices, and crew
resource management (CRM) techniques. To make the bow-tie diagram
concise, all reports that had been identified under OP were further analyzed.
Reports that had a similar chain of events were visually represented in one bowtie diagram resulting in a total number of four bowtie diagrams. In total, two
hazards were identified: UAS flying and UAS landing. For UAS landing, hard
landing or abnormal runway contact and an aerodynamic stall/spin were
identified as the top events. For UAS flying, total engine failure and mid-air
collision were identified as the top events.
Hard Landing or Abnormal Runway Contact. The bow-tie diagram
for a hard landing or an abnormal runway contact is shown in Figure 6. The
left-hand side of the bow-tie diagram shows all the identified threats associated
with a hard landing or abnormal runway contact and the barriers that could be
placed as defenses to mitigate the risk associated with the identified threats. If
the top event occurs, the right-hand side shows all the consequences that could
result from the top event and the barriers that could be placed to control the
risks associated with each consequence. For the top event in Figure 8,
distraction, tailwind, delayed action, visual illusion, UAS disorientation, and
loss of control (LOC) of UAS were identified as the major threats that could
lead to a hard landing or abnormal runway contact. Next, each threat's
contribution to the top event was also identified.
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Distraction, delayed action, visual illusion, and UAS disorientation were
identified as the major contributors to the top event. A LOC of aircraft and
tailwind were identified as the medium contributors to the top event. It was
clear that in order to mitigate the risk associated with these threats, specific
barriers were necessary to implement in UAS operation in order to make sure
that events such as hard landing are avoided. These barriers were training,
flying under supervision, flying in line of sight (LOS), avoiding first-person
view (FPV) flying, flight planning, and procedural knowledge, and compliance.
On the right-hand side of the top event, all the consequences that could
arise from the top event were identified. These consequences included damage
to the nose wheel, damage to nearby property, and damage to UAS. Out of all
the consequences, UAS damage was categorized as a major concern while
damage to a nose wheel and property was categorized as medium concerns. The
barriers on the right-hand side were identified in such a manner that if the top
event occurs, the scenario does not escalate into a consequence. Barriers such as
weather evaluation, procedural knowledge, and compliance, not flying near a
property, and adequate supervision can be implemented to ensure that a top
event does not escalate into an undesired consequence.
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Figure 6: Bow-tie Diagram For Hard Landing And Abnormal Runway Contact
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Additionally, the Bow-TieXP software provides the capability to include
details regarding barriers consisting of personnel responsible, basic risk factor
(brf) code, the criticality of the barrier, effectiveness of the barrier, and barrier
type. Personnel accountable helps identify who is responsible for the identified
barrier‘s current and future state. The brf code indicates the code the barrier
belongs to such as hardware, design, maintenance management, operating
procedures, error-enforcing conditions, incompatible goals, organizational
factors, communications, training, and defenses. The criticality of the barriers
helps identify how critical the barrier is for the threat. The effectiveness of the
barrier helps identify how effective the barrier will be once it is implemented.
Barrier type helps identify the function of a barrier. In addition to identifying
the function of the barrier, it also helps to identify different types of systems
that be used to implement the function of the barrier. The systems available in
the software are behavioral, active hardware, socio-technical, continuous
hardware, and passive hardware. This helped in identifying the level of detail in
barriers such as whether the barriers were present or absent and any other
relevant aspect necessary in understanding the role of barriers in mitigating risk
corresponding to threats. From the bow-tie diagram and the reports, it was
concluded that even though the majority of barriers were present, they were not
adequately implemented to mitigate the risk. Also, from the bow-tie diagram, it
was identified that distraction was the primary escalation factor for the barriers.
An escalation factor, in a bow-tie diagram, helps identify the weakness that may
be present in a barrier.
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Aerodynamic Stall/Spin. Aerodynamic stall/spin event was visually
represented next in the bow-tie diagram. The chances of an aerodynamic stall or
spin are rare in nature unless the pilot-in-command (PIC) decides to perform
high-speed maneuvers or tries to fly their UAS beyond its performing
capabilities without any necessary training. In such a scenario, chances of an
aerodynamic stall or spin drastically increases. Figure 7 shows the bow-tie
diagram for the identified top event. The identified threats included delayed
action and the loss of a communication link. Wherein, delayed action was
categorized as a high contributor to top event while the loss of a communication
link was categorized as a low contributor to the top event.

Figure 7: Bow-tie Diagram for Aerodynamic Stall/Spin
Training and supervision were identified as barriers that could be placed
to ensure that any risk associated with delayed action is mitigated. Both training
and supervision play a crucial role in reducing the risk of UAS going in an
aerodynamic stall of spin as the PIC can be trained depending upon the UAS
model, not to perform maneuvers beyond their UAS performance capabilities.
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Also, after the PIC has received their training, they can be allowed to fly their
UAS under strict supervision to ensure that they fly under the performance
capabilities of the UAS. Distraction was identified as an escalation factor for
supervision. There can be occasions where the supervisor is distracted due to a
myriad of reasons and fails to notice that the PIC is not flying within the UAS
performance limits. This could result in an aerodynamic stall even under
supervision. Therefore, the supervisor should make sure that he or she is free
from distractions during the flight.
Pre-flight inspection, UAS checklist, not flying near high voltage lines
or cell phone towers and, GPS and communication checklists were identified as
barriers that could be placed to ensure that risks associated with loss of
communication link can be mitigated. Pre-flight inspection is a crucial part of a
flight and ensures that all the flight components are in perfect working
condition. The pre-flight inspection includes checking the battery level on the
UAS and controller, making sure the controller is connected to the UAS,
components such as the rotor or camera are firmly attached to the main body,
and that the device the PIC uses to monitor the UAS is fully charged and
connected to the UAS. The UAS checklist is a step-by-step checklist that allows
the PIC to check for each component of their flight. Having a flight plan can
help the PIC identify if anything is missing or incomplete. Flying near high
voltage lines or cell phone towers can interfere with the communication link
between the controller and UAS which could result in a lack of the initial
communication set-up with the UAS. Therefore, it is not advisable to fly near
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high voltage lines until the necessary precautions are taken. GPS and
communication checklists may fall under a UAS checklist and are generally
used to ensure that the controller and UAS have adequate GPS connection
before the flight is initiated. One escalation factor identified for pre-flight
inspection was the failure to complete an inspection or perform an incomplete
inspection. This means that the PIC does not make sure that adequate
communication is set-up before the flight that could result in a loss of a
communication link between the controller and the UAS.
One of the primary consequences associated with an aerodynamic stall
or spin is UAS damage which was categorized as a major concern. Whenever
an aerial system is forced to perform beyond its performance capabilities, it can
result in a damaged airframe. For small and lightweight UAS, damage can be
pervasive depending upon the maneuver it was performing or the speed that it
was flying at the time of the aerodynamic stall or spin. The barriers that can be
placed to ensure that the top event does not escalate to consequences are flying
below the performance limitation of the UAS and checking flight parameters
such as speed and altitude. These barriers, if properly implemented, can play a
crucial role in preventing an aerodynamic stall or a spin. However, recreational
flyers tend to be more ―adventurous‖ when flying their UAS. If a recreational
flyer does not have much experience in flying, they might want to fly at higher
speeds and altitude to test their UAS‘ capabilities resulting in a scenario where
an aerodynamic stall or spin is inevitable.
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Total Engine Failure. Next, total engine failure was visually
represented using the bow-tie diagram. Although the chance of an engine failure
is rare, it is still a viable top event that can increase the level of risk associated
with flying a UAS. A bow-tie diagram for total engine failure is shown in
Figure 8. The threats that were identified that could lead to the top event are
icing conditions, loss of voltage in batteries, foreign object damage (FOD),
delayed action, engine overheating, and failure of engine components. Out of all
of these threats, icing conditions, loss of voltage of batteries, and engine
overheating were categorized as low contributors to the top event. FOD was
identified as a medium contributor while delayed action and failure of engine
component were identified as a major contributor to the event of an engine
failure. For icing condition weather evaluations, pre-flight planning and postinspection flight were identified as barriers that could mitigate the risks.
Weather evaluation and pre-flight planning, especially, for colder weather
conditions, can be helpful to the PIC in evaluating if the current weather
condition is permissible for flying. Icing conditions for fixed wings UAS not
only reduces the ability of wings to generate lift; it significantly increases drag
generation that could adversely affect UAS performance. After the evaluation,
if the PIC believes it is feasible to fly in icing conditions, the PIC must perform
a thorough post-flight inspection to ensure that all control surfaces or engine
components are free of ice. UAS checklist, pre-flight UAS inspection, and
charging batteries to an optimum percentage were identified as barriers for loss
of voltage from batteries. UAS checklists and pre-flight inspections are both
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important procedures before initiating a flight. These barriers can help the PIC
in ensuring that the controller, as well as the UAS batteries, are charged to the
optimum level. If these procedures are not followed, it results in flying the UAS
with a low level of charge in the battery resulting in mid-flight loss of power to
the engine and ultimately could result in UAS failure. To ensure this does not
happen, the PIC should ensure that batteries are fully charged and spare
batteries are available in case of a battery failure or loss of voltage occurs. FOD
is dangerous to engines and the structure of the UAS. The PIC is responsible for
ensuring that a thorough pre-flight inspection is completed to ensure that the
launch area is clear of FOD. Delayed action is a threat that is ever present if the
PIC is not aware of procedural knowledge. In the event of an engine failure, any
delayed actions can lead to loss of control and failure of UAS.
The risks associated with a total engine failure can be mitigated by
ensuring that the PIC has a good understanding of the procedure to undertake in
case of an engine failure. Supervision is another barrier that could be used to
ensure that an inexperienced PIC can handle engine failure properly. However,
supervisors can be prone to distraction which was identified as an escalation
factor for supervision.
Engine overheating although rare can occur if the PIC decides to fly
their UAS beyond its performance limits. For example, if a UAS is flown at
high speed for a prolonged time, it could overheat the engine components. If
immediate actions are not taken, the engine overheating could lead to engine
damage or engine failure. To mitigate risks, the PIC must know the
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performance limitations of their UAS and procedures in handling any situations
that involve engine overheating. Inadequate performance evaluations were
identified as an escalation factor for performance limitation evaluation. Failure
of engine components can be catastrophic if the risk is not mitigated. One of the
best ways to ensure that this does not happen is for the PIC to conduct a
thorough pre-flight inspection to check for visible damage in the engine or
abnormalities in engine components.

Figure 8: Bow-tie Diagram for Total Engine Failure
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UASs can be destroyed if a total engine failure event is reached. Even if
the top event occurs, barriers such as emergency procedures and protocols and
UAS operating checklists can be used to ensure that the UAS is brought down
safely. Emergency procedures are a vital step in identifying what has happened
and what needs to be done if the top event has occurred. It is the sole
responsibility of the PIC or the supervisor to ensure that an emergency
procedure checklist is available in case of engine failure. Another consequence
identified from the bow-tie diagram was damage to property. If the PIC flies
near the property, damage to the property can occur if an engine failure occurs.
To ensure that this consequence is not reached, barriers such as avoid flying
near property, supervision, and procedural knowledge and compliance could be
so the PIC can steer a UAS away from the property. This can only happen if the
PIC understands the risks associated with flying near the property and has a
good understanding of the procedures to follow if flying near the property. UAS
getting destroying and damage to property were identified as medium concerns.
However, distraction was identified as an escalation factor as it may result in
slower response time in the event of an engine failure.
Mid-Air Collision. The final event identified from NTSB data analysis
was a mid-air collision. Mid-air collisions are a severe consequence that could
result in multiple fatalities if adequate safety measures are not taken to ensure
safe operation of UASs and manned aircraft in the NAS and near airports. The
bow-tie diagram for a mid-air collision is shown in Figure 9. Flying close to
manned aircraft, flying UASs in unauthorized airspace, poor visibility,
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irresponsible flying, and flying beyond LOS were identified as threats that
could lead to a mid-air collision between a UAS and a manned aircraft. Out of
these, flying close to manned aircraft and irresponsible flying were identified as
major contributors to the top event while poor visibility and flying beyond LOS
were identified as medium contributors to the top event. A mid-air collision
between a UAS and manned is rare, but there have been instances in the past
where there was a mid-air collision in which the UAS was destroyed, and
manned aircraft was able to land without a dire consequence. This does imply
that all the safety measures are in place as the manned aircraft was able to land
without any fatalities. If not mid-air collision, then flying close to a manned
aircraft can lead to a mid-air collision if the risks associated with it are not
mitigated. Barriers such as NOTAMs, airspace awareness training, geo-fencing,
and UAS traffic management can be placed to ensure that a UAS does not come
near a manned aircraft. NOTAMs, inform ATC wherein the PIC of the UAS can
provide details regarding the nature of their flight operations. ATC can then
inform manned aircraft that may have their flight or approach path near the
UAS operation. NOTAMs is an efficient way of informing concerned parties
about UAS operations which can significantly reduce the risks of operating
UASs near manned aircraft. One escalation factor identified for NOTAM was
that the PIC might not know how to issue a NOTAM which could increase the
risks of operating UASs near an airport.
During data analysis, it was also found that many pilots had some or
very little understanding of airspace classification. This resulted in a PIC flying
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where they were not allowed or where authorization was not given from ATC.
Airspace awareness training needs to be implemented to ensure that the PIC is
aware of the surrounding airspace and what needs to be done to ensure safe
operations, mainly, in airspace that requires ATC authorization.
UAS traffic management is maintaining a smooth flow of UASs within
the NAS and near airports. This can be generally achieved by ensuring that a
PIC request authorization from ATC to operate their UAS. For this particular
barrier, ATC plays an integral role in keeping a safe distance with manned
aircraft and the UAS. Poor visibility conditions can result in a perceptual error
where the PIC may not be able to accurately locate a UAS‘ position or have a
clear field of vision, both of which could result in a mid-air collision. Weather
evaluation and pre-flight planning were the barriers identified to reduce the risk
associated with poor visibility. It is always a good measure to perform a
weather evaluation and pre-flight planning before a flight as it helps evaluate
whether the conditions are good enough for LOS flying.
Flying beyond LOS can be potentially dangerous as the PIC may not be
entirely sure about the UAS‘ position. Flying beyond LOS could also result in a
delayed action and slow response time. To encounter these threats, procedural
knowledge is a must for the PIC. If the PIC plans to fly beyond LOS, then it is
the PIC‘s responsibility to have a good understanding of the procedural
knowledge and have a checklist with them to ensure that aspects of the mission
are followed. If the PIC wants to fly beyond LOS, it is always helpful to keep a
visual observer during the operation. Under procedural knowledge, the PIC
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should have a good understanding of the UAS being flown and regulations that
govern flying beyond LOS.

Figure 9: Bow-tie Diagram For a Mid-Air Collision
Two significant consequences that could arise from a mid-air collision
between a manned aircraft and a UAS are damage to manned aircraft and a
UAS being destroyed. Both of these consequences are a major concern. To
ensure that damage to manned aircraft does not occur, airspace awareness
training, NOTAMs, and UAS traffic management should be placed to ensure
that damage to manned aircraft does not take place. Mainly, UAS traffic
management is an essential barrier that can ensure that manned aircraft always
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have the right of way when UAS is flying nearby. NOTAM is another barrier
that will give essential information to the pilots of manned aircraft about UAS‘
activity in their proximity. Although pilots of manned aircraft have an excellent
understanding of airspace classification, UAS pilots may be unaware of the
classification and might fly in airspace without authorization. If there is a midair collision between a manned flight and a UAS, a UAS may decimate due to
the impact forces. In order to prevent this consequence from happening, it is the
PIC's responsibility always to give the right of way to manned aircraft. By
doing so, risks of a mid-air collision can be drastically reduced.
ASRS Results. The ASRS reports as previously mentioned are
submitted voluntarily. Therefore, a majority of reports that have been filed were
from a PIC or a visual observer. After the data analysis, it was evident that
unsafe acts were the most frequently occurring HFACS category while
exceptional violation was the most frequently occurring sub-category under
unsafe acts. Keeping in mind the format and the nature of the information that
was available in the reports, unsafe acts seemed to be an appropriate result for
the ASRS reports. One drawback of ASRS reporting is that not everyone is
accustomed to the online reporting system. Despite numerous incidents or
accidents being reported, there may be more incidents unreported by the PIC,
visual observer, or the third party who notices the unusual UAS activity due to a
lack of awareness of the ASRS reporting system. Without knowing the risks
that are associated with unreported incidents, a more thorough risk assessment
cannot be accomplished.
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For the current study, all reports that had unsafe acts were analyzed.
From this, it was found that the majority of reports had reported airspace
violations in the form of flying within five miles of an airport, excursion from
assigned altitude, and operating UAS without authorization from the FAA and
the ATC. Also, other top events identified were equipment problem,
unauthorized operation of a UAS near a moving train, UAS operating over a
group of people, UAS operator forgetting to inform ATC regarding their
operation, and UAS flying close to a building. For the bow-tie diagram, keeping
in mind the top events identified from the reports, a single bow-tie group of
UAS flying was created. Under this group, all identified top events were
divided into UAS flying within five miles of an airport, operating near an
automotive or aircraft or operating over people, and flying near a building. The
bow-tie diagram for these three top events is discussed in this section.
Flying Within five Miles of an Airport. The first identified top event
was a UAS flying within five miles of an airport. From the reports, it was
evident that the UAS operator was unaware of the regulation that they are not
supposed to operate a UAS within five miles of an airport. The majority of these
reports were from recreational UAS flyers. Although these incidents did not
result in a severe consequence, there are risks associated that must be mitigated
to prevent future undesired consequences. From the reports, it was also
identified that the PIC did not realize that UAS operators are not permitted to
fly within five miles of an airport. It is this deficiency in the risk management
that poses the most significant risk for UAS operating near or at airports. The
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other threats and the consequences that could arise from operating UAS within
five miles of an airport are shown in Figure 10.
The threats identified include a near mid-air collision (NMAC), poor
visibility, flying out of LOS, delayed action, loss of communication link, and
UAS disorientation. NMAC, flying out of LOS, delayed action and UAS
disorientation were identified as major contributors to the top event while poor
visibility conditions and loss of communication link were identified as low
contributors to the top event. One of the most imminent threats of flying a UAS
within five miles of an airport is an NMAC. Flying a UAS five miles within an
airport brings the UAS right in the approach path of a manned aircraft which
increases the risk of an NMAC. The reports, as shown before, showed that the
majority of UAS operators did not realize that UASs were not permitted to fly
within five miles of an airport, and also did not realize that their UAS was
within five miles of an airport. These reports pointed out the UAS operator‘s
lack of knowledge regarding rules and regulations.
In order to mitigate the risks associated with NMAC, the barriers
identified were flight plan and procedural knowledge compliance. It is advised
that UAS operators develop a proper flight plan before commencing their flight.
The flight plan would help identify the airspace for the UAS flight and how
close the airspace is to an airport. A flight plan will show the procedures to
follow. Implementing these barriers would significantly reduce the risk of an
NMAC
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Figure 10: Bow-tie Diagram for Flying a UAS Within Five Miles of an Airport
. Poor visibility can also be a threat that leads to a PIC flying within five
miles of an airport due to a lack of visibility that a UAS was too close to an
airport. In order to mitigate risks associated with a reduced visibility condition,
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the PIC must conduct a complete weather evaluation and include it in the flight
plan.
Flying out of LOS is another threat that poses risks. A few reports
mentioned that a PIC after flying a UAS beyond LOS realized that the UAS was
dangerously close to an airport. Therefore, a PIC must always operate the UAS
within the LOS. This occurs when the PIC has a good understanding of
procedural knowledge and regulations, has a visual observer, and completes a
pre-flight briefing about the nature of the operation. From all the barriers,
distraction was identified as an escalation factor for the visual observer. Next,
delayed action when flying a UAS can result in the UAS coming in contact with
a manned aircraft or airport perimeter. Both of these are considered a dangerous
activity that can potentially shut down an airport or result in a mid-air collision.
The risks associated with delayed action can be mitigated by implementing a
flight plan and making sure that the PIC has a good command of procedural
knowledge. Having a flight plan will help in knowing where a PIC plans to
carry out their mission. By knowing beforehand where they are going to fly
their UAS or their mission, chances of delayed action are brought down
significantly. The risks associated with loss of communication link can be
mitigated by conducting a pre-flight inspection to make sure that the UAS is
connected to the controller and vice-versa. It is also helpful to ensure that UASs
and controllers are charged to an optimum level for the mission. One major
issue that could arise for new UAS operators is UAS orientation mid-flight. Due
to the small structure and design of a UAS, sometimes, it can be difficult for
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new flyers to identify the orientation or the direction their UAS is flying.
Barriers such as flying in LOS and procedural knowledge can help a PIC
understand the UAS orientation. It is essential to fly in LOS if the PIC is unsure
of the orientation of the UAS. The PIC could determine its orientation and take
necessary action to bring the UAS back if it had deviated from the intended
flight path. However, poor visibility is a concern for flying in LOS because if
the visibility is deteriorating and the PIC is unaware of the UAS orientation, it is
advisable to abort the flight and wait for visibility to improve.
For the current top event, there were four consequences identified: Midair collision, damaged to manned aircraft, delay at airports, and disruption of air
traffic movement. Each of these was categorized as a major concern to the top
event. One of the most recognizable consequences of flying a UAS within five
miles of an airport is a mid-air collision with a manned aircraft. Flying close to
an airport is not only a breach of federal regulation to operate a UAS; it
drastically increases the level of risk for both manned aircraft and the UAS.
Emergency procedures and flight plans are the barriers that can be used to
ensure that the consequence as mentioned earlier is not reached. If the PIC plans
to fly a UAS within five miles, it is necessary that ATC authorizes the operation
before the flight. Over the past few years, there have been several instances
where a UAS was sighted close to an airport. However, one issue with
implementing this barrier is that not everyone is aware of or knows how to
contact ATC for authorization and does not know what to do next after
authorization is received. In one of the ASRS reports, the PIC had obtained the
90

authorization from ATC, but when the flight was initiated, the PIC forgot to call
ATC again to inform them about his flight. It was only after the flight was
completed, the PIC realized that even after receiving authorization, he still
needed to inform ATC before the flight. It is necessary that the PIC knows what
procedures to follow to fly a UAS within five miles of an airport. In addition to
the previously described consequence, damage to manned aircraft can also be
considered a consequence that the PIC would want to avoid. It must be
understood that the manned aircraft are bigger and more potent than UASs and
an impact between them will destroy the UAS. This impact can also severely
damage manned aircraft. Several incidents of damages caused by UASs to
manned aircraft were previously discussed in Chapter 1. To make sure that this
consequence is not reached, barriers such as a review of NOTAMs by the flight
crew of manned aircraft and flight plan by the PIC of the UAS can be
implemented to ensure that both parties are aware of the presence of other
aircraft. This way, the UAS can be at a safe distance from any manned aircraft
and any chance of potential damage to manned aircraft is significantly reduced.
Recently, UAS sightings have become an issue at airports. The immediate
action taken by airport authorities is to ground all flights. This causes a domino
effect and affects the entire day‘s operation at an airport resulting in multiple
delays and disrupts traffic movement at the airport and surrounding airports.
Barriers such as geo-fencing and adherence to FAA regulations can be
implemented to ensure that this does not happen. Having a general awareness of
FAA regulations will help the PIC understand the associated risks and what can
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be done so that risks are not escalated to a level where an undesirable
consequence is reached.
Flying a UAS Near an Automotive, an Aircraft, or Over People. The
second top event identified was operating a UAS near a moving automotive or
an aircraft and over a group of people. For the top event, poor visibility, loss of
communication link, delayed action, flying out of LOS, and UAS disorientation
was identified as threats that pose a risk when operating UAS near a moving
automotive or over people. Out of all the threats mentioned above, poor
visibility and loss of communication link were identified as low contributors to
the occurrence of the top event. Whereas, UAS disorientation, delayed action,
and flying out of LOS were identified as a high contributor of risk associated
with operating UASs near an automotive and over people. The bow-tie diagram
for the aforementioned top event is shown in Figure 11. Any risks associated
with poor visibility, as mentioned in previous sections, can be mitigated by
making sure that the PIC completes a thorough weather evaluation before the
flight.
Loss of communication of link is another threat that poses a high level
of risk particularly for operating UAS over people. In the case of a lost
communication link, the UAS may go rogue and injure individuals directly in
the path of the UAS. Barriers such as pre-flight inspection, UAS checklists,
communication checklists, and GPS checklists can be implemented to ensure
that all critical communication links are set before a flight.
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Figure 11: Bow-tie Diagram for Flying a UAS Near an Automotive, An
Aircraft or People
It is to be noted that it is the sole responsibility of the PIC to make sure
that adequate communication link is established between the controller and the
UAS. Delayed action is another threat that poses a significant threat to the
occurrence of the top event. A delayed action can result in a collision with the
automotive or UAS falling on people. Barriers such as flying under supervision,
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having a good command of procedural knowledge and compliance as well as
training can mitigate risks associated with operating a UAS over people. Even
though flying over people is not permissible, it is advised that the PIC makes
adequate emergency plans to avoid people getting injured due to a UAS failure.
However, as previously mentioned, distraction was identified as an escalation
factor that could limit the effect of training as well as a supervision barrier in
risk mitigation. Risks of hitting a moving automotive or injuring a person
significantly increase if the PIC is flying beyond LOS. Barriers such as having a
visual observer, avoiding flying in FPV, providing training, and having a flight
plan can mitigate the risk. Even if the PIC wants to fly beyond LOS, it is their
responsibility to ensure that a visual observer is present who can maintain visual
contact with the UAS at all times. As mentioned in the previous section, UAS
disorientation can prove to be very dangerous especially when it is being
operated near a moving automotive or over a group of people. UAS
disorientation occurs when the PIC is not aware of the direction the UAS is
flying. If the PIC is unaware of the UAS‘ direction, it can hit a moving
automotive and sustain damage as well as cause injuries to people in it. Barriers
such as training, procedural knowledge and flying a UAS in LOS can be
implemented to ensure that the PIC knows the orientation of the UAS they are
operating. Training can especially help a PIC understand how UASs operate
mid-air which can help them identify UAS' position concerning themselves.
When a UAS is operated beyond LOS, the risk of losing the UAS orientation
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greatly increases. Therefore, it is advised that the PIC must always operate their
UAS in LOS so visual confirmation about the UAS‘ orientation can occur.
For the top event, damage to automotive, injury to people, and damage
to UAS were identified as a consequence that could arise from flying a UAS
close to a moving automotive or over people. All three consequences were
identified as major concerns. If a UAS is flying near a moving automotive, the
first consequence that could arise is a UAS hitting the automotive and damaging
it. This could also result in a UAS getting damaged or destroyed. Barriers such
as having an emergency plan as part of the checklist, procedural knowledge,
and compliance and flying in LOS, can mitigate the risk if the top event is
reached and limit the severity of the effects of consequence. These barriers can
help the PIC understand what the risks involved are if they are going to operate
their UAS near a moving automotive. Another consequence that could arise is
an injury to people. If the top event is reached, then barriers such as an
emergency plan, flying at a safe distance from people, and flight plan can be
implemented to ensure that there are no injuries if the UAS is to be operated
near or around people.
Flying Near a Building. Flying near a building was the third top event
that was identified from the data analysis. People often fly their UASs for
recreational purposes too close to a building or a property for a variety of
purposes. Flying near a building can be very dangerous if adequate steps are not
taken to mitigate the risks associated with it. The bow-tie diagram for flying
near a building is shown in Figure 12. From the bow-tie diagram, loss of
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communication link, delayed action, inexperienced pilot, UAS disorientation,
LOC of UAS, and flying out of LOS was identified as threats that could lead to
the occurrence of the top event. Out of these, loss of communication link was
identified as a low contributor to the occurrence of the top event while delayed
action, inexperienced pilot, UAS disorientation, LOC of UAS, and flying out of
LOS were identified as high contributors to the occurrence of the top event.
Although LOC is rare, the risks associated with it cannot be ignored.
Barriers such as a pre-flight checklist, procedural knowledge, and pre-flight
planning can be implemented to mitigate the risks. Without a pre-flight
checklist, the communication link that needs to be established between the
controller and the UAS may not be adequately established resulting in a
communication lag or loss during mid-flight. Having a pre-flight checklist
assists the PIC to check all the necessary items, particularly, whether proper
communication is established between the controller and the UAS. Procedural
knowledge, in this case, refers to the PIC having a good understanding of how
to set-up a communication link between the controller and the UAS. New pilots
need to be trained with procedural knowledge in order to mitigate the risk of an
incomplete checklist procedure. Delayed action is another threat that plays a
significant role in an incident or an accident when flying near a building.
Barriers such as supervision and training can be implemented to ensure that
when the PIC is operating near a building, and the UAS gets dangerously close
to a building, the PIC can make corrective decisions in the form of maneuvers
to steer away from the building.
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Figure 12: Bow-tie Diagram for Flying a UAS Near a building
If the PIC is untrained, it is advisable that a supervisor is present at all
times to ensure that adequate actions are taken promptly. As previously
mentioned, whenever a supervisor suggests a barrier, distraction can be an
escalation factor. An untrained pilot or an inexperienced pilot is another threat
that cannot be ignored. Not everyone who buys or flies a UAS is an experienced
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pilot. Everyone buys it for the first time, and they need time and practice to fly
it efficiently. Inexperienced flying near a building can be dangerous especially
when the PIC is unaccustomed to the user interface of the UAS. One barrier that
can be implemented to mitigate risks associated with an inexperienced pilot is
training. Training is a crucial part of flying a UAS as with different model of
UAS, the controller is different and so is the user interface. Therefore, it is
highly recommended that whenever a PIC is flying a UAS, the PIC needs to get
familiar with the user interface of that particular UAS to mitigate risks,
particularly, if flying near a building.
UAS disorientation is another threat that is in many ways inter-linked
with an inexperienced pilot. UAS disorientation, if flying near a group of
closely located buildings can result in fatal consequences. Risks of flying near a
building significantly increase when an inexperienced pilot loses track of their
UAS‘ orientation. To mitigate risks, barriers such as flying in LOS, supervision,
and training can be implemented to ensure that the PIC always has a good idea
of their UAS‘ orientation. It is best to fly with a third party that can act as a
supervisor to provide details regarding the UAS orientation and directs the PIC
to re-orient the UAS as necessary. It is advisable that when the PIC is flying
with a group of people, the PIC should assign the task of being a visual observer
to ensure that a UAS is staying on its intended flight path. If the PIC is flying
solo, it is the PIC‘s responsibility to fly in the LOS to ensure the UAS is flying
in its intended flight path. However, poor weather conditions can add difficulty
in maintaining constant visual contact with the UAS. Under such circumstances,
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depending upon the visibility conditions, the PIC should decide whether to fly
or not. If visibility is deteriorating, it is advisable to wait for the visibility to
improve before resuming UAS operations. In doing so, the level of risk
associated with operating a UAS near a building is greatly reduced. Another
threat that can be linked to a LOS link is the loss of control of an aircraft. LOC
of UASs can result in either the loss of communication from the controller or
due to a mechanical failure. LOC of UAS when flying near a building can result
in damage to property, cause injury to people, and result in the destruction of
the UAS. To ensure that this does not happen, pre-flight UAS inspection and
training can be implemented as barriers to keep the risk to an acceptable level.
Pre-flight inspection can help the PIC identify anomalies in the UAS,
particularly, for mechanical components. Pre-flight inspection can also help the
PIC determine if the controller and the UAS are in perfect working condition
for its desired operation. When the PIC decides to fly beyond LOS, it greatly
reduces the PIC‘s ability to look out for obstacles that may be in the path of the
UAS especially when flying near buildings. Flying beyond LOS also results in
delayed action which further increases the risks associated flying near a
building. To mitigate a growing risk from flying beyond LOS, the first and
foremost barrier that needs to be implemented is flying in LOS. Flying in LOS
not only helps the PIC maintain visual contact with the UAS, but it also helps
the PIC monitor the surrounding environment to ensure that there are no
obstructions present in the UAS‘ path.
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Damage to a building and a UAS being destroyed or damaged are the
two consequences that were identified from the bow-tie that could arise if the
top event occurs. Damage to property was identified as a medium concern while
damage or destruction of a UAS was identified as a major concern from the top
event. If the top event is reached, that is, if a UAS is operated close to a
building, then it can result in damage to a building. To ensure that this does not
happen, one of the barriers that can be implemented by the PIC is to avoid
flying near buildings. Procedural knowledge and flight plans are two additional
barriers that can be placed between the top event and consequence to ensure that
the consequence is averted even if the PIC decides to operate their UAS near a
building. The flight plan should be developed in such a manner that it keeps the
UAS as far away as possible from buildings. This includes that if the mission
takes the UAS too close to a building or a structure, adequate procedures are
available to handle emergencies. Similarly, to avert UAS damage or destruction,
the PIC should avoid flying near buildings and have a good understanding of
the procedures necessary to operate a UAS near a building.
Implications for Practice
The result from the study, in general, showed that the level of risks
associated with operating a UAS in the NAS and near an airport is greatly
influenced by the nature of the UAS‘ operation. From the NTSB results, it was
evident that although the operations were carried out following the standard
operating procedures (SOP) or were carried out under supervision, incidents
still occurred. These incidents showed what is still missing in terms of risk
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assessment. This study particularly highlighted the errors in UAS operations
which required a thorough risk assessment in order to mitigate risks. These
errors included hard landings, aerodynamic stalls/spins, engine failures, and
mid-air collisions. For the NTSB reports using qualitative content analysis, it
was found that the organizational influence played a crucial role in the majority
of the incidents. This shows that risk assessment needs to start from top level
management. Several personnel issues, as well as organizational factors, were
also identified as the holes in the Swiss Cheese Model. These issues included a
lack of training to the personnel operating the UAS, delayed action, inadequate
supervision among many others. After the completion of the analysis of the
NTSB reports, bow-tie diagrams were used to highlight the most pertaining
threats from the top events that were identified from the content analysis
findings. These threats and their barriers when analyzed concerning the reports
suggest that many of the barriers were already present at the time of the incident
but did not mitigate the risks because the risk mitigation tool was not used. In
order to provide adequate defenses in the Swiss Cheese Model, it is necessary
that all the barriers are implemented. If these barriers are not implemented, even
for a short time, it could result in a chain of events where the level of risk could
increase over time.
The ASRS results showed that the majority of the PICs that operate
UASs are unaware of the rules and regulations that govern flying UASs in the
NAS or near airports. The majority of the reports filed had incidents related to
airspace violation and UASs operating within five miles of an airport. Under
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Part 107, UAS operations are strictly prohibited within five miles of an airport.
A majority of ASRS reports were about UAS operating within five miles of an
airport. FAA Part 107 also specifies that to operate in specific airspace class, the
PIC needs ATC authorization. However, the results showed that the PIC was
unaware of the requirement to get authorization from ATC. In one case, It was
after the flight was completed that the PIC realized that they needed permission
from ATC for the just-concluded flight. Other events identified from the results
were operating near a moving automotive, flying at an unassigned altitude,
excursion from assigned altitude, and flying close to a building. The ASRS
database has reports that were voluntarily submitted, and it clearly shows that
the general public or a person who flies a UAS for recreational use has very
little knowledge of the regulation that governs the operations of UASs in the
NAS or near airports. These factors play a significant role in increasing the risks
associated with operating a UAS. Once the analysis was complete, the bow-tie
diagram helped visually represent all the identified top events, the threats, and
the consequences. Next, barriers were identified to mitigate risks arising from
the threats and the top event. From the bow-tie diagram, it was clear that even if
the PIC is flying a UAS for recreational use, the PIC needs to have a proper
checklist in their possession to ensure that all aspects of the mission are checked
and ready before the flight. The PIC needs to be well trained and should have a
good understanding of the airspace classification and in which airspace class the
UAS can be operated with and without authorization from ATC. Even though
the FAA has multiple resources available for UAS operators, not everybody is
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aware of it. Such a situation creates a gap in information which does not help in
conducting a thorough risk assessment for safe operations of UASs.
Recommendation for Future Studies
The current study had used qualitative content analysis to find the
HFACS category of the most frequently occurring contributing factors and
probable cause(s) for UAS incidents and accidents. From the results of the data
analysis, the bow-tie diagram was used to identify the top events, the threats,
and consequence that could arise from operating a UAS in the NAS and near
airports. After the risk assessment, this study can be replicated to conduct
incident analysis using IncidentXP which is part of the Bow-tieXP software
package. In IncidentXP tripod, diagrams are used for incident analysis. Tripod
beta diagrams are the next step towards conducting incident analysis to analyze
the barriers that were implemented in the bow-tie diagram. When analyzing a
scenario, the tripod data will help to understand what happened, how did it
happen and why did it happen. In a tripod diagram, each identified barrier can
be analyzed to see whether the barrier would be effective, ineffective, adequate,
failed, or missing from the scenario. The tripod diagram can help the researcher
determine and better understand the root cause of the scenario that is being
analyzed. In addition to a thorough analysis of the incident barriers, analysis
from tripod beta diagrams will identify the agent that triggered the incident and
identify the object that had changed due to the incident. The object, for a given
scenario, is anything that is tangible and is affected by the outcomes of the
incident.
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This study can also be replicated using a quantitative research
methodology. For a quantitative study, a questionnaire can be developed and be
distributed to commercial UAS operators or to students who actively fly a UAS
for recreational purposes. The format of the questionnaire can be designed to
ask participants basic questions about UAS operations. The questionnaire can
include a question regarding what procedures are followed, pre-flight
inspections, UAS checklists, fundamental FAA Part 107 regulations, and
emergency procedures. A questionnaire would assist the researcher in
identifying threats arising from UAS operations and assist in conducting risk
assessments by analyzing the answers provided by the participants. From the
results, the researcher would be able to provide adequate safety
recommendations for safe UAS operations in the NAS and near airports. From a
quantitative research methodology point of view, the study should have a large
sample size to provide a thorough risk assessment.
This study can also be replicated in order to see the effectiveness of the
barriers that were identified in the bow-tie diagrams. To see the effectiveness of
barriers, a test flight in an open field could be planned to see whether the
barriers assisted in mitigating risks. This can be done by asking the participants
to fly their UAS in two different scenarios. The first scenario would be
comprised of participants flying without implementing barriers from the bow-tie
diagram. The second scenario would be comprised of participants being asked
to fly their UAS but this time barriers would be implemented in their flying.
Participants would first be asked to fly a predetermined course. This course
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could be anything from flying over an obstacle, flying beyond LOS, or failure
situation such as a UAS component failure or loss of communication link.
Results from both scenarios could be compared to evaluate which barrier
worked in mitigating risks and which barriers failed to mitigate risks.
Conclusions
As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the number of UAS sightings has
drastically increased over the last few years. Even though these sightings did
not result in serious incidents or accidents with multiple fatalities, these
sightings cannot be taken lightly. As these sightings increase, the risks
associated with operating UAS in the NAS and near airports is also increasing.
From the current study, several factors involved in a UAS incident or accident
were identified and analyzed. The study also identified several events that could
potentially lead to incidents or accidents. These events, threats, and
consequences were identified that could increase risks associated with their
corresponding event. From the bow-tie diagram, it was evident that there were
several factors in UAS operations that could increase the severity of threats and
their corresponding consequences. These factors range from organizational
influence, operating procedures, training, supervision, unsafe acts, and violation
of regulations for operating a UAS in the NAS or near an airport. The study also
highlighted that the majority of UASs flown for recreational purposes do not
adhere to FAA Part 107 regulations.
Furthermore, in several reports, it was evident that the PIC was unaware
of regulations that govern safe operations of UASs in the NAS and near
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airports. For all the threats and consequences, barriers were identified that need
to be implemented to mitigate risks. The research also identified barriers that
can be placed to ensure that consequences are not reached. The risk assessment
showed that it is the sole responsibility of the PIC to ensure that their mission
does not pose a threat to manned aircraft within their proximity, does not
disrupt air traffic movement at an airport, does not pose any danger to people or
property, and that the mission is carried out strictly under FAA Part 107
regulations. In order to do so, the PIC must have a thorough knowledge of their
mission, what UAS they plan to operate, and have a checklist ready with them
at all times. The checklist can be divided into two parts: Pre-flight checklist and
post-flight checklist. The PIC is advised to plan their flight keeping in mind all
of the crucial factors that can impact their mission and have an emergency plan
ready to react on time. By implementing the barriers in the form of flight
planning, training, airspace awareness training, UAS operational procedural
knowledge, weather evaluation, pre-flight and post-flight inspections, flying in
LOS, flying with a visual observer or under supervision, and adherence to FAA
Part 107 regulation can mitigate risks when operating a UAS in the NAS and
airports. In addition, it is also important that general awareness is created for the
UAS operators. There are already multiple resources available both online and
in hardcopy that provide all relevant information for operating UAS. However,
these resources often go unnoticed and chances are there that the UAS operator
may not refer to these resources before conducting their flight. As different
industries have started using UAS for their operations, it is important that the
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FAA and companies that manufacture UASs develop an outreach programs for
UAS operators. These programs can be in form of webinars, seminars, or
advertisments that inform new UAS operators about the regulations pertaining
UAS operations. In this day and age of social media, there are several options
available to the FAA and UAS manufactures like informative ads that can help
spread awareness for UAS operations.
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Appendix A
ASRS Data Collection Form
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Data
Categories

ASRS Report Number:

Flight
Condition
Flight Plan
Flight Phase
Airspace Class
Contributing
Factors
Anamoly

Detector

When
Detected

Result

Events

HFACS
Category

Unsafe
Acts

Preconditions
Unsafe
Organisational
for Unsafe
Supervision
Influences
Acts
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Appendix B
NTSB Data Collection Form
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Data Categories

NTSB Accident Number:

Narrative
Analysis
Probable Cause
and
Findings
HFACS
Category

Unsafe Preconditions
Acts
for Unsafe
Acts
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Unsafe
Supervision

Organizational
Influences

